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capitalisms, path-dependencies and rent-seeking on the other. As 
longstanding concerns with remaining obstacles to more mobility for 
workers, services, business entities and capital in recent years are aligned 
with post-Lisbon commitments to creating the World’s leading 
competitive market, European corporate governance regulation [ECGR] 
has become exposed to and implicated in a set of highly dynamic 
regulatory experiments. In this context, ‘New Governance’ offers itself as 
both tentative label and immodest proposal for a more responsive and 
innovative approach to European law making. The following paper 
assesses the recently emerging regulatory forms in ECGR as illustrations 
of far-reaching transformations in market governance. The arguable 
parallels between the EU’s regulatory transformation in response to 
growing legitimacy concerns and the recurring question about whose 
interests a business corporation is intended to serve, provide the 
framework for an exploration of current regulatory trajectories in 
European corporate law that can most adequately be understood as a 
telling example of transnational legal pluralism. 
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‘NEW GOVERNANCE’ IN EUROPEAN CORPORATE 
LAW REGULATION AS TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
PLURALISM 
Peer Zumbansen* 
I. EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
REGULATION: EMBEDDEDNESS AND CO-EVOLUTION 
The European Commission’s corporate governance agenda occupies a 
unique place within the European imagination. Since the beginning, the 
‘European company law scene’ occupied regulators and policy makers 
inside and outside of Europe, and recent innovations and changes in the 
approaches to regulatory governance have given this area a set of 
noteworthy turns. The arrival of ‘new governance’ in the area of European 
Corporate Governance Regulation [ECGR] brings the already charged 
interests and dynamics that are at stake in this area, into much sharper 
contours. New Governance [NG] is itself a label for a tremendously 
challenging and provoking trajectory for the EU’s transnational 
governance. Ever since ‘governance’ entered the scene through the 
Commission’s ‘White Paper on European Governance’ in 20011, the 
spectre of a fundamental transition from government to governance has 
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1 “EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE. A WHITE PAPER” [COM(2001) 428 final], dated 25 July 
2001, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexyUriServ/site/en/com/2001/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf (last visited 7 
April 2008). 
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been haunting Europe2, as well as transnational regulatory spheres.3 The 
Commission’s definition of governance as ‘a very versatile one […] being 
used in connection with several contemporary social sciences, especially 
economics and political science’, and as one originating ‘from the need of 
economics (as regards corporate governance) and political science (as 
regards State governance) for an all-embracing concept capable of 
conveying diverse meanings not covered by the traditional term 
“government”’4 is very open-ended and leaves one wondering whether the 
definition is meant to conclude or open an inquiry into the changing nature 
of market regulation.5 
 
Without intending to overly strain the Commission’s reference to 
corporate governance in the cited definition, the following observations 
will nevertheless point to particular complementarities between the EU’s 
ongoing construction process and the unfolding European Corporate 
Governance Matrix. The varied history of European corporate law 
regulation is marked by the diversity of interests and concerns invested in 
this area of regulation. While the legislative record was, until recently, not 
altogether comprehensive6, ECGR has in the last years become one of the 
                                                 
2 See F. W. Scharpf, Governing Europe. Effective and Democratic? (Oxford University 
Press, 1999), the contributions in C. Joerges/Y. Mény/J. H. H. Weiler (eds.), Mountain or 
Molehill? A Critical Appraisal on the Commission White Paper on Governance (Harvard 
Law School Jean Monnet Working Paper No.6/01, 2001), and the analysis by D. 
Trubek/L. G. Trubek, 'Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role 
of the Open Method of Coordination', (2005) 11 European Law Journal 343-364. 
3 See e.g. A.-M. Slaughter, 'Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public 
Accountability of Global Government Networks', (2004) 39 Government and Opposition 
159-190. 
4 European Commission: ‘GOVERNANCE’, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/index_en.htm (last visited 7 April 2008) 
5 Hereto, see  C. Möllers, 'European Governance: Meaning and Value of a Concept', 
(2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 313-336 (for a scathing critique of the 
omnipresent resorting to a still poorly defined and demarcated concept). 
6 For an overview of the legislative acts in the area of company law up to 2000, see J. 
Wouters, 'European Company Law: Quo Vadis?' (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 
257-307, and V. Edwards, EC Company Law (Oxford University Press, 1999); for a more 
recent discussion of state and prospects of EC company law making, see K. J. Hopt, 
'European Company Law and Corporate Governance: Where does the Action Plan of the 
European Commission Lead?' in K. J. Hopt,E. Wymeersch,H. Kanda and H. Baum (eds.), 
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most vibrant sectors of norm-creation and regulatory interaction. As such, 
ECGR has become a regulatory universe of its own, with a large portfolio 
within the Commission’s Internal Market division and a seemingly tireless 
expert community feeding into the policy and norm making process at 
every turn. With ECGR long having left the confines of the European 
Court of Justice, the Council and Parliament, it has expanded into an 
extremely versatile, comparative and transnational legal field. ECGR 
constitutes a semi-autonomous field, comprised both of hard law and 
social norms, which are in a constant relation of complementarity, fusion 
and irritation.7 As such ECGR presents formidable challenges for legal, 
economic, sociological or political analysis. From the point of view of 
legal pluralism, the particularity and intricacy of ECGR lies in its mixed 
constitution of law and ‘social norms’.8 Seen through the legal pluralist 
lens, ECGR develops as a co-evolutionary process, where the imposition 
of law – which encompasses regulations, directives, recommendations and 
judgments – is both shaping and being shaped by the norms evolving 
outside of its imposition. Similar to the unpredictability of consequences 
and effects of rights/principles-transplants9, ECGR faces enormous 
                                                                                                                         
Corporate Governance in Context (Oxford University Press, 2005); for a continuously 
updated listing of directives, regulations and recommendations, see the website of the 
European Commission at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/index_en.htm 
(last visited 5 April 2008) 
7 S. F. Moore, 'Law and Social Change: the semi-autonomous field as an appropriate 
subject of study', (1973) 7 Law & Society Review 719-746; G. Teubner, 'Eigensinnige 
Produktionsregimes: Zur Ko-evolution von Wirtschaft und Recht in den varieties of 
capitalism', (1999) 5 Soziale Systeme 7-25 
8 P. Zumbansen, 'Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to Regulatory 
Competition in European Company Law', (2006) 12 Eur. L. J. 534-556; see generally S. 
E. Merry, 'Legal Pluralism', (1988) 22 Law & Society Review 869-901; H. W. Arthurs/C. 
Mummé, 'From Governance To Political Economy: Workers As Citizens, Stakeholders 
and Productive Social Actors. Paper for the First International CLPE Conference: The 
Corporate Governance Matrix: Unfolding the New Agenda, Osgoode Hall Law School, 
Toronto, 20-21 October 2005', (2005) CLPE Research Paper Series 
(www.comparativeresearch.net) , published in (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 439-
470 
9 G. Teubner, 'Legal Irritants: How Unifying Law Ends Up In New Divergences', in P. A. 
Hall and D. Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 2001); K. Pistor, 'Of Legal 
Transplants, Legal Irritants, and Economic Development', in P. Cornelius and B. Kogut 
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challenges in terms of legal certainty and strategy, given its many sources 
of potential disturbance, irritation, and complementing points due to its 
complex regulatory agenda. With view to the challenges facing the EU 
from the substantive enlargement in 2004, Silvana Sciarra observed: ‘As 
the tradition of comparative legal scholarship in Europe has taught us, the 
attempt to pursue a “transplant” of legal institutions uncritically is both a 
sign of disregard for traditions different from the one to be transplanted, 
and, very often, is an inefficient solution.’10 
 
Adding to the difficulties arising from the multilevel and multi-stakeholder 
dimension in company law regulation in Europe, ECGR has been 
amplifying the tensions that underlie the conceptual and architectural 
distinction between ‘company’ and ‘capital market’ law, which are deeply 
embedded in a country’s market Regulation histories.11 Struggling with 
competing policy goals regarding the enhancement of market freedoms as 
they relate to capital market rules on the one hand and to corporate 
governance law on the other, ECGR is driven to actualize ‘the best of both 
worlds’. Yet, while corporate law itself appears to continue to withstand 
all attempts at deconstruction and demystification by other conceptual 
                                                                                                                         
(eds.), Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy (Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
10 S. Sciarra, 'The Convergence of European Labour and Social Rights: Opening to the 
Open Method of Coordination', in G. A. Bermann and K. Pistor (eds.), Law and 
Governance in an Enlarged European Union (Hart Publishing, 2004), 155 (with 
reference to Kahn-Freund, (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 1) 
11 R. Wiethölter, Interessen und Organisation der Aktiengesellschaft im amerikanischen 
und deutschen Recht (C. F. Müller, 1961); R. Buxbaum/K. J. Hopt, Legal Harmonization 
and the Business Enterprise. Corporate and Capital Market Law Harmonization Policy 
in Europe and the U.S.A. (Walter de Gruyter, 1988); F. Kübler, 'The Impact of Equity 
Markets on Business Organization: Some Comparative Observations Regarding 
Differences in the Evolution of Corporate Structures', (2001) 2 European Business 
Organization Law Review [EBOR] 669-683; H. Merkt, 'Zum Verhältnis von 
Kapitalmarktrecht und Gesellschaftsrecht in der Diskussion um die Corporate 
Governance', (2003) 48 AG 126-136; H. Eidenmüller, 'Forschungsperspektiven im 
Unternehmensrecht', (2007) 62 Juristenzeitung [JZ] 487-494; N. Moloney, 'New 
Frontiers in EC Capital Markets Law: From Market Construction to Market Regulation', 
(2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 809-843; for the U.S., see only R. Romano, 'The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance', (2005) 114 Yale 
L. J. 1521-1611 
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frameworks as to what corporations do12, ECGR finds itself deeply 
involved in a large, ever-so amorphous market-building project. The 
‘function’ of the firm, as necessarily implicated within ECGR, must now 
extend far beyond the financial-organisational dimensions that have 
recently again been depicted as the ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ of corporate 
law. Within the European project, in particular after the Lisbon Summit 
200013 and its most recent reinvigoration in form of a ‘social makeover’14, 
corporate law has become a strategic token in a complex multilevel 
governance game that brings a much wider range of players to the policy-
making table than any single Market regulation unit would reasonably 
want to assume responsibility for. 
 
While the to-do-list for ECGR, only seems to keep growing in view of 
pressing competitive, social, environmental and monitoring demands15, it 
has in fact always been evolving in a particularly accentuated and 
contested field of contrasting and competing Member State agendas in 
pursuit of national prosperity, of which corporate and capital market law 
                                                 
12 See only Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law (Little Brown, 1986), at 5 (regarding the 
importance of incorporating labour law into one’s study of business corporations); but see 
R. Kraakman/P. L. Davies/H. Hansmann/G. Hertig/K. J. Hopt/H. Kanda/E. B. Rock, The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 
13
 ‘THE LISBON SPECIAL EUROPEAN COUNCIL (MARCH 2000): TOWARDS A EUROPE OF 
INNOVATION AND KNOWLEDGE’ (HTTP://EUROPA.EU/SCADPLUS/LEG/EN/CHA/C10241.HTM) 
(LAST VISITED 5 APRIL 2008) 
14 Euractiv: Lisbon Agenda gets social makeover (18 March 2008), reporting on the 13-
14 March 2008 Summit’s recommendations to move away from its purely “growth and 
jobs” focus of the past three years and to put the environment and citizens more “in the 
foreground” (http://www.euractiv.com/en/innovation/eu-lisbon-agenda-gets-social-
makeover/article-171013) (last visited 5 April 2008) 
15 See the Commission’s Action Plan of 2003 “MODERNISING COMPANY LAW AND 
ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION – A PLAN TO MOVE 
FORWARD” [COM (2003) 284 Final]; see also the Director General’s for Internal Market 
and Services’ Summary Report of 2007 on the “Consultation and Hearing on Future 
Priorities on the Action Plan […]”; on the tasks lying ahead, see K. J. Hopt, 'European 
Company Law and Corporate Governance: Where does the Action Plan of the European 
Commission Lead?' in K. J. Hopt,E. Wymeersch,H. Kanda and H. Baum (eds.), 
Corporate Governance in Context (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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had always been a central building block.16 As such, ECGR has never sat 
comfortably within the wider market integration agenda. The real 
challenges of company law harmonization, however, became impressively 
obvious during the exhausting struggle over the adoption of a regulation 
concerning the creation of the European Company statute, originally 
initiated already in the 1970s, and eventually passed after many more 
compromises, in 2001.17 Another illustration of how ECGR has been 
inextricably caught up in the European ‘Varieties of Capitalism’18 was, 
without doubt, the long contest over a European Takeover Directive19, 
which resulted in 2004 in a Directive full of loop-holes and opt-out 
clauses.20 Eddy Wymeersch recently called the moment of adopting the 
Directive a ‘provisional semi-final point in a process that has taken more 
than 17 years, and according to some even more than 30 years on the way 
                                                 
16 J. W. Cioffi/S. S. Cohen, 'The state, law and corporate governance: the advantage of 
forwardness', in S. S. Cohen and G. Boyd (eds.), Corporate Governance and 
Globalization. Long Range Planning Issues (Edward Elgar, 2000) 
17 E. Werlauff, 'The SE Company - A New Common European Company from 8 October 
2004', (2003) 14 European Business Law Review [EBLR] 85-103; C. Teichmann, 'The 
European Company - A Challenge to Academics, Legislatures and Practitioners', (2003) 
4 German L. J. 309-330 
18 P. A. Hall/D. Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 2001) 
19 See R. J. Gilson, 'The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the 
European Corporate Governance Environment', in K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds.), 
European Takeovers. Law and Practice (Butterworths, 1992), and E. Wymeersch, 
'Problems of the Regulation of Takeover Bids in Western Europe: A Comparative 
Survey', in K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds.), European Takeovers. Law and Practice 
(Butterworths, 1992). 
20 For the history, see C. Kirchner/R. W. Painter, 'Takeover Defenses under Delaware 
Law, the Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the New German Takeover Law: 
Comparison and Recommendations for Reform', (2002) 50 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 451-476; P. Zumbansen, 'European Corporate Law and National 
Divergences: The Case of Takeover Law', (2004) 3 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. 867-
886; for a recent analysis, see Blanaid Clarke, ‘Takeover Regulation: Through the 
Looking Glass’, (2007) CLPE Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy 
Research Paper No. 18, available at: www.comparativeresearch.net/papers.jsp; for a US-
UK comparative perspective, see John Armour & David Skeel Jr., ‘Who Writes the Rules 
for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? – The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover 
Regulation’, (2007) Georgetown L. J. 1727-1794. 
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to opening up the European markets for corporate control.’21 At the time, 
André Nilsen observed that ‘[T]he Takeover Directive sees light after a 
long and acrimonious journey through the institutional labyrinth in 
Brussels.’22 
 
As the regulatory trajectory of ECGR continues to unfold, we must be 
even more sensitive to the degree to which this enterprise remains deeply 
embedded in the particular dynamics of multilevel governance of 
European integration on the one hand23 and the globalization of markets 
and regulatory processes on the other.24 Under such conditions, an 
assessment of the concrete forms of norm-creation presents great 
challenges due to ECGR’s complex appearances ranging from ‘hard’ to 
‘soft’ law to norms that are developed, promulgated and disseminated by a 
panoply of public and private actors.25 Therefore, instead of trying to free 
ECGR from its embeddedness in this complex regulatory environment, the 
emphasis must be on the exact opposite. Precisely by embracing the 
embeddedness of ECGR as a transnational legal field can we begin to 
                                                 
21 Eddy Wymeersch, ‘The Takeover Bid Directive, Light and Darkness’, (January 2008) 
Financial Law Institute Working Paper No. 2008-01, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086987, at 2 
22 A. Nilsen, 'The EU Takeover Directive and the Competitiveness of European Industry', 
(2004) The Oxford Council on Good Governance 
http://www.oxfordgovernance.org/fileadmin/Publications/EY001.pdf 
23 See M. Jachtenfuchs, 'The Governance Approach to European Integration', (2001) 39 
Journal of Common Market Studies 245-264; I. Bache/M. Flinders (eds.), Multi-level 
Governance (Oxford University Press, 2004); but see now C. F. Sabel/J. Zeitlin, 
'Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the 
EU', (2008) 14 European L.J. 271-327. 
24 See e.g. D. Rodrik, 'Governance of Economic Globalization', in J. S. Nye and J. D. 
Donahue (eds.), Governance in a Globalizing World (Brookings, 2000); David S. Law, 
‘Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights’, (2008) Nw. U. L. Rev. 1-82, at 
31: ‘Although globalization appears to have levelled off in the world’s wealthiest 
countries in recent years – and the “social” component, in particular, now lags behind the 
“economic” and the “political” components – the overall trend across all countries 
remains one of increasing globalization.’ 
25 For a succinct account of this regulatory development, see D. Trubek/L. G. Trubek, 
'Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of 
Coordination', (2005) 11 European Law Journal 343-364. 
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better see the concrete as well as the amorphous forms of change. 
Embeddedness is here understood in the following four dimensions: 
 
a) ECGR is informed by the policy and legislative dynamics between 
corporate law and capital-market law (securities regulation) as well 
as between corporate law and labour law, categorizations of 
functionally separable legal areas that can be found in all advanced 
industrialized societies and that are increasingly challenged 
through global forces of rule-making; 
b) ECGR is entangled in the European ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ with 
regard to corporate and labour regulation, as evidenced for 
example in the struggle over the Takeover Directive and the statute 
of the Societas Europaea; 
c) ECGR as part of the larger project towards the completion of the 
European internal market26, in particular in the post-Lisbon 
environment of knowledge society politics within the EU27 
d) ECGR as semi-autonomous field, marked by a vibrant and yet 
precarious, always threatened balance between official law 
making, transnational consultations, expert committee preparatory 
work, recommendations, communications and standardization, that 
we see unfolding on the domestic, EU-supranational and 
transnational level. 
 
The following section (II) will further draw out the correlations between 
the ECGR and the unfolding forms of ‘new’ and ‘experimental’ 
governance forms in the EU. Section III will work out the connections 
                                                 
26 C. Barnard/S. Deakin, 'Market Access and Regulatory Competition', in C. Barnard and 
J. Scott (eds.), The Law of the Single European Market. Unpacking the Premises (Hart 
Publishing, 2002) 
27 See the Presidency Conclusions of the Council of the European Union [7652/08], 
March 13-14, 2008, available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/99410.pdf, at 4: 
‘The implementation of the broad-based innovation strategy is key to realising EU 
ambitions in the area.’ For an intriguing historical background, see Dominique Pestre, 
Science, Society and Politics. Knowledge Societies from an Historical Perspective. 
Report to the Science, Economy and Society Directorate, European Commission, January 
2007, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-
society/document_library/pdf_06/historical-perspectives_en.pdf. 
2008] ‘NEW GOVERNANCE’ 9 
 
 
 
between the transnational pluralism of ECGR and emerging, parallel 
forms of transnational norm-creation by focusing on the disclosure of 
executive compensation. The emergence of de-territorialized, hybrid 
regulatory regimes, consisting of both hard and soft norms governing 
particular elements of corporate governance accentuates the degree to 
which ECGR has come under pressure to facilitate quasi-neutral, ‘best’ 
practices in ‘good’ corporate governance. This functionalist 
‘normalisation’ of corporate governance standards illustrates, in turn, how 
the European Company Law scene28 sees itself increasingly 
transnationalized. As a result, corporate governance regulation presents 
formidable challenges with view to developing adequate enabling rules for 
corporate actors in highly competitive global markets while not frustrating 
critics’ attempts at preventing the insulation of emerging regulatory 
processes from outside assessment. The paper will suggest that a 
combination of ‘reflexive corporate governance’ and ‘transnational legal 
pluralism’ can best capture this new regulatory challenge.  With this body 
of law constituting an intricate combination of both substantive and 
procedural aspects, evolving intertwined processes of law/norms 
negotiation, dissemination and alternative ‘enforcement’ modes, ECGR 
goes beyond and reaches across categories through which comparative 
company law scholars have been assessing the function of the 
corporation29 and the rules governing its behaviour.30 Part IV concludes.  
                                                 
28 C. Schmitthoff, 'The Future of the European Company Law Scene', in C. Schmitthoff 
(eds.), The Harmonisation of European Company Law (The U.K. Nat'l. Committee of 
Comparative Law, 1973) 
29 R. Kraakman/P. L. Davies/H. Hansmann/G. Hertig/K. J. Hopt/H. Kanda/E. B. Rock, 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 
30 La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F.,  Shleifer A. and  Vishny R. ‘Law and finance’, 
(1998) Journal of Political Economy, 106: 1113-1155; La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F.,  
and Shleifer A. (2007) ‘The economic consequences of legal origins’ available at SSRN 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028081), (2007) Journal of Economic Literature forthcoming; 
see the critique by Simon Deakin, ‘Corporate Governance and Human Development’, 
Tanner Lectures presented at the University of Oxford, February 2008, ms. on file with 
author; B. Ahlering/S. Deakin, 'Labor Regulation, Corporate Governance, and Legal 
Origin: A Case of Institutional Complementarity?' (2007) 41 Law & Society Rev. 865-
903; Roe, M. (2006) ‘Legal origins, politics and modern stock markets’ (2006) 120 
Harvard Law Review, 460-527; M.Siems, ‘Shareholder protection around the world 
(“Leximetric II”)’, (2008) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, forthcoming 
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II. ‘NEW’ AND ‘EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE’ IN 
EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW REGULATION: 
TOWARDS TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PLURALISM 
A. ECGR BETWEEN HARMONIZATION AND REGULATORY 
COMPETITION 
 
Any assessment of emerging forms of corporate governance regulation in 
Europe has to build on the fast-growing body of scholarship by legal 
sociology and conflicts of laws scholars31 on the one hand and 
comparative company law experts on the other.32  The present challenge in 
facilitating a mutually enriching dialogue and exchange between this 
scholarship and the ongoing exploration of EU governance, which remains 
– due to its complexity of levels and contexts of regulation – for the most 
part a domain almost exclusively gardened by EU-focused regulatory 
theorists. One important area of ‘overlap’ between EU regulatory work 
and Corporate Governance scholarship is marked by the tension between 
harmonization and regulatory competition. This perspective has for years 
been informing a fruitful comparative inquiry into the different conditions 
in particular between the U.S. federal organisation of corporate law 
making (states) and securities regulation (federal).33 Recent years have 
                                                 
31 See e.g. A. Riles, 'A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the 
Technicalities', (2005) 53 Buffalo L. Rev. 973; R. Michaels, 'The Re-State-Ment of Non-
State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism', 
(2005) 51 Wayne L. Rev. 1209-1259; R. Michaels, 'The True New Lex Mercatoria: Law 
Beyond the State', (2007) 14 Ind. J. Glob. Leg. Stud. 447-468; P. Schiff Berman, 'Global 
Legal Pluralism', (2007) 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1155-1237 
32 See e.g. K. J. Hopt/P. C. Leyens, 'Board Models in Europe. Recent Developments of 
Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France and 
Italy. ECGI Law Working Paper No. 18/2004', in: 2004 available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=487944;  
33 See only R. Buxbaum, 'Federal Aspects of Corporate Law and Theory', in T. Daintith 
and G. Teubner (eds.), Contract and Organisation. Legal Analysis in the Light of 
Economic and Social Theory (Walter de Gruyter, 1986), and D. Charny, 'Competition 
among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Rules: An American Perspective on the 
"Race to the Bottom" in the European Communities', (1991) 32 Harvard International 
Law Journal (Harv. Int'l L.J.) 423-456. 
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seen significant process in reaching beyond the obvious obstacles to 
comparisons by focusing, on the one hand, more clearly on the evolving 
flexible and hybrid forms of regulation in Europe34 and, on the other, by  
sophisticating the underlying comparative methodologies.35 Again, the 
emphasis on the paradoxical nature of the emerging regulatory forms as 
being both embedded in learned regulatory practices from within the 
Member States and disembedded in terms of evolving within a 
dramatically globalising market points to the difficulties of disentangling 
any assessment of ECGR from the larger project of European integration36 
which is itself inescapably and always tied to processes of globalization of 
capital, labour, and rights. 
 
It is against this background that the particular challenges facing ECGR 
can best be illustrated, by studying them through the lens of transnational 
law and, more specifically, through the emerging prism of transnational 
legal pluralism. The connection of observations of the transformation of 
public and private international law towards ‘transnational law’37 and the 
legal-sociological and anthropological work on legal pluralism offers 
important insights into a better understanding of current trajectories of 
functionally determined regulatory areas. ECGR is a powerful illustration 
of such a functional field, determined both by its semi-autonomous nature 
with regard to its tension between law/norms and politics/market. The 
latter are powerfully evident in ECGR, which emerges through the co-
                                                 
34 S. Deakin, 'Regulatory Competition versus Reflexive Harmonisation in European 
Company Law', in D. C. Esty and D. Geradin (eds.), Regulatory Competition and 
Economic Integration. Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2001); J. 
Armour, 'Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory 
Competition', (2005) 55 Curr. Leg. Probls. 369-413; G. Hertig/J. A. McCahery, 'Optional 
rather than Mandatory EU Company Law: Framework and Specific Proposals', (2007) 
European Company and Financial Law Review [ECFR] 341-362 
35 See David C. Donald, ‘Approaching Comparative Company Law’, (2008) Fordham J. 
Corp. & Fin. L. forthcoming, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1092452; K-J Hopt, ‘Comparative 
Company Law’, in: (2006) Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law 1161-1191. 
36 P. Zumbansen, 'Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to Regulatory 
Competition in European Company Law', (2006) 12 Eur. L. J. 534-556 
37 P. C. Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press, 1956) 
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evolution of the different functional dynamics, which drive corporate 
organisation. At the same time, the fast-emerging forms of new corporate 
organisation such as private equity vehicles and hedge funds seem to defy 
an organisation-oriented assessment of the firm in favour of a differently 
positioned analysis of contemporary corporate forms. As the ‘end-of-
history’ thesis in comparative corporate governance scholarship and the 
Berle-Means paradigm of corporate organisation and its related 
governance issues are revisited and recontextualised38, the dramatic threat 
of a mortgage-loan meltdown in the spring of 2008 points to the need of a 
comprehensive reassessment of the corporate governance approach for an 
understanding of the financial structures of the corporate form and the 
contested aspiration of financial markets regulation.39 
 
B. THE POLARITIES OF EU GOVERNANCE: GLOBAL 
COMPETITIVENESS, INDIRECT REGULATION AND ‘REFLEXIVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE’ 
 
Recent ECGR developments must be seen in the context of a highly 
diversified series of norm-setting processes resulting in a veritable 
explosion of corporate governance codes in Europe and elsewhere.40 With 
the proliferation of corporate governance codes, influenced and pushed by 
international41 and transnational activities of norm setting, discussion and 
thought exchange42, it has become increasingly difficult to identify a 
                                                 
38 See W. W. Bratton/M. L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf 
Berle and The Modern Corporation, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1021273 
2007); D. Tsuk, 'From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th Century 
American Legal Thought', (2005) 30 Law & Soc. Inquiry 179-225. 
39 Marcel Kahan/Edward B. Rock, ‘Hedge Fund Activism in the Enforcement of 
Bondholder Rights’, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-02, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093387; see already Sanford Jacoby, ‘Finance and Labor: 
Perspectives on Risk, Inequality, and Democracy’, (2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020843 
40  See the list of codes in various countries at www.ecgi.org. s 
41 OECD; WCFCG; IVCGN 
42 ECGI, INSEAD, Euroshareholders etc. 
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single institution or author of a set of norms. Instead, the production and 
dissemination of corporate governance rules has for some time now taken 
on the nature of migrating standards43 and a cross-fertilization of norms is 
now regarded as eminent and necessary in shaping future corporate 
activity. A distinct feature of this de-territorialized production of norms is 
the radical challenge these processes pose for our understanding of what 
we call law proper. With the dissemination of corporate governance codes, 
disclosure standards and rules, best practices and codes of conduct, not 
only corporate and securities law, but also other fields of law – such as 
labour and employment law – change. The decentralization of norm 
producers is repeated, mirrored and reflected in the hybridization of the 
norms themselves. It is in this sense, that the study of the proliferation of 
corporate governance codes and company law production in general and 
of the rules of remuneration disclosure in particular feeds into a broader 
research into the changing face of legal regulation in globally integrated 
marketplaces. What shines through particular developments in individual 
jurisdictions in this regard, is a most poignant exhibition of particular legal 
and political cultures and political economies of law making and economic 
regulation.44 
 
‘New’ or alternative modes of governance have been emerging in response 
and reaction to the regulatory challenges that inevitably arise from these 
distinct variances in ‘Member States’ regulatory design. The most 
remarkable regulatory innovation in recent years is without doubt the so-
called Open Method of Coordination [OMC], which, after emerging 
during the 1990s in the realm of politically contested national, economic 
and employment policies, had been formally adopted at the 2000 Lisbon 
Summit. Its defining feature has been the proceduralisation of regulatory 
governance by benchmarking and disseminating non-binding objectives 
                                                 
43  See for a comparable analysis of migrating human rights standards, C. Scott/R. Wai, 
'Transnational Governance of Corporate Conduct through the Migration of Human Rights 
Norms: The Potential of Transnational "Private" Litigation', in C. Joerges,I.-J. Sand and 
G. Teubner (eds.), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 
2004). 
44 P. Zumbansen, 'Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to Regulatory 
Competition in European Company Law', (2006) 12 Eur. L. J. 534-556 
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and standards across a growing body of regulatory areas.45 ‘In the years 
following the Lisbon Summit, the OMC […] appeared to have become the 
governance instrument of choice for EU policymaking in complex, 
domestically sensitive areas, where diversity among the Member States 
precludes harmonisation but inaction is politically unacceptable, and 
where widespread strategic uncertainty recommends mutual learning at the 
national as well as the European level.’46 The departure of the OMC from 
the more rigid norm-generation and enforcement program of the 
‘Community Method’ has been both welcomed and criticised.47 What 
Francis Snyder identified as ‘the challenge of sites’ facing the European 
Constitutionalist project48, indeed constitutes the framework for the 
proliferating norm-generation processes of ECGR. As we will see in the 
example of regulating the disclosure requirements for executive 
compensation, this area of ECGR is marked by a deep, underlying tension 
between increasingly decentralised, indirect regulatory forms on the one 
hand and vaguely defined and yet broadly conceived policy goals against 
which the adequacy and the success of lower-level norm-setting processes 
will be measured, on the other. At the same time, EU internal corporate 
governance negotiations are increasingly becoming disembedded from the 
exclusionary European context as they are complemented, irritated and 
shaped by those norms and principles (‘best practices’ and ‘guidelines’ 
that are disseminated on the transnational level, promulgated, for example, 
by actors such as the OECD).49 
 
                                                 
45 D. Hodson/I. Maher, 'The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case of 
Soft Economic Policy Coordination', (2001) 39 Journal of Common Market Studies 719-
746 
46 C. F. Sabel/J. Zeitlin, 'Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governance in the EU', (2008) 14 European L.J. 271-327, at 292 
47 See e.g. J. Scott/D. Trubek, 'Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance 
in the European Union', (2002) 8 European Law Journal 1-18;  
48 F. Snyder, 'European Constitutionalism in the 21st Century', in T. Tridimas and P. 
Nebbia (eds.), European Union Law for the Twenty-First Century, vol. 1 (Hart 
Publishing, 2004), at 13 
49 See the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, rev. 2004, available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/principles_en_final.pdf. 
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Seen, thus, under the magnifying glass, ECGR can be described to unfold 
as a particular open-ended and contestable practice.50 Even a cursory 
overview of the emerging features of ECGR suggests strong corollaries 
between ECGR and emerging general forms of ‘new’51 or ‘experimental’ 
EU governance52 on the one hand and between ECGR and transnational 
governance forms in corporate and labour law on the other.53 
  
On the ‘inside’ of the European integration process, recent years have seen 
a tremendous drive towards the creation of ever-more flexible forms of 
indirect regulation, benchmarking and rule/standards production through 
expert groups and advisory committees. As Simon Deakin argues in this 
issue54, expert groups such as the European Corporate Governance 
Forum55, while importantly building on recent experiences with the 
Winter I and II groups and their vital contribution to break the deadlock 
over the Takeover Directive, nevertheless reinforce and further accentuate 
the drive towards a ‘right’ standard in corporate governance regulation 
despite the declarations that many years of debating the convergence and 
divergence of corporate governance standards56 should support the view 
that ‘no one size fits all’.57 
                                                 
50 See N. Reich, Understanding EU Law. Objectives, Principles and Methods of 
Community Law, 2nd ed. (Intersentia, 2005), 307: ‘Governance is concerned with 
achieving this balance between legitimate and illegitimate uses of autonomy.’ 
51 Critically: Scott/Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap’, supra; see also K. A. Armstrong, 
'Rediscovering Civil Society: The European Union and the White Paper on Governance', 
(2002) 8 European Law Journal 102-132. 
52 Sabel/Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference’, supra. 
53 P. Zumbansen, 'The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and Labor Law', (2006) 
13 Indiana Journal of Global Studies 261-312 
54 S. Deakin, 'Reflexive Governance and European Company Law, in: CLPE Research 
Paper Series 2007', in: available at: www.comparativeresearch.net (in this issue) 
55 See the website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/index_en.htm. 
56 See e.g. J. N. Gordon, 'Pathways to Corporate Governance ? Two Steps on the Road to 
Shareholder Capitalism in Germany', (1999) 5 Columbia Journal of European Law 219-
241; R. J. Gilson, 'Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or 
Function?' (2001) 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 329-357; E. Wymeersch, 'Convergence or 
Divergence in Corporate Governance Patterns in Western Europe?' in J. A. McCahery,P. 
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Paradoxically, the operational method of the OMC, originally designed to 
promote greater flexibility and pressure to foster a race to the top in social 
standards, transforms itself in the context of the ECGR into an engine 
towards ‘best practice in corporate governance’. The utilitarian, soft-law 
approach as here employed, leads to considerably different results than 
would have been hoped for in other areas of the OMC. With view to the 
earlier described tensions between different regulatory trajectories of 
corporate governance – consisting of an amalgamation of company law, 
securities regulation, taxation and insolvency law – the pursuit of ‘best 
practices’ is determined by a considerably narrower scope of functional 
concerns. At this point, the goals of this pursuit are fused too fast and 
probably too uncritically with the functional orientation of the post-Lisbon 
Innovation and Competitiveness Agenda. By emphasizing the need to 
ensure the economic performance and, connected herewith, the integrity 
and stability of financial institutions58, corporate governance as a 
regulatory field is taken out of the more complex regulatory context we 
have seen unfold over the course of the 20th century.59 
 
As the globalisation of corporate activity and finance undermines any 
attempt at effectively re-domesticating corporate governance into the 
                                                                                                                         
Moerland,T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneborg (eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes. 
Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
57 See Frits Bolkestein, Corporate Governance in the Euopean Union, Speech of October 
18, 2004 on the occasion of the Inauguration of the ECGF in The Hague, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/460&format=PDF
&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; See J. Winter, 'Report of the High Level 
Group of Company Law Experts on A Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law 
in Europe', (2002) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report_en.pdf, at 9, 72. 
58 Bolkestein, preceding note 
59 See e.g. A. A. Berle, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (Harcourt, Brace & 
World, 1954); M. J. Roe, 'Path Dependence, Political Options and Governance Systems', 
in K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds.), Comparative Corporate Governance. Essays and 
Materials (Walter de Gruyter, 1997); E. Berglöf/E.-L. v. Thadden, 'The changing 
corporate governance paradigm: implications for developing and transition economies', in 
S. S. Cohen and G. Boyd (eds.), Corporate Governance and Globalization. Long Range 
Planning Issues (Edward Elgar, 2000). 
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previously contained political economies of nation-states, the more 
appropriate conceptual approach would be to argue for the need for a 
transnationalization of corporate governance regulation. In the case of 
ECGR this would mean to first recognise the need for a differentiated 
assessment of different nation-state regulatory experiences and their 
presently continuing variations and innovations.60 The next step would 
then not consist in ‘translating’ specific regulatory instruments onto the 
transnational sphere, but, instead, in fostering a radically functionalist 
understanding of corporate governance. Such an approach would go 
beyond the now abundant references to ‘best practices’, which owe their 
content more to the ideological battles out of which they are emerging 
than to a truly functionalist governance model. Such a model would have 
to be developed with the complete corporation, its markets, governance 
structures, dynamics and contextual performance practices in mind. 
Building on work regarding ‘reflexive law’ in the area of corporate 
governance and corporate environmental responsibilities61, a more 
adequate governance approach would have to start with the corporation 
itself, complementing simultaneously continuing assessments of the 
organisational functionalities of the corporation.62 While such functionalist 
approaches to corporate governance are only now emerging63, their 
promise lies in their pursuit of governance models that are evolving 
directly out of the practice, management and operation of complex 
business entities on uncertain markets.  
                                                 
60 For the example of Germany, see only U.Noack/D.Zetzsche, ‘Germany’s Corporate 
and Financial Law 2007 (Getting) Ready for Competition’, (2007) Center for Business 
and Corporate Law Research Paper No. 06/2007, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=986357. 
61 G. Teubner, 'Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the 'Essence' of the 
Legal Person', (1988) 36 Am. J. Comp. L. 130-155; E. Orts, 'Reflexive Environmental 
Law', (1995) 89 Northwestern University Law Review 1227-1340; K.-H. Ladeur, 'Die 
Prozeduralisierung des Unternehmens', in D. Hart (eds.), Privatrecht im "Risikostaat" 
(Nomos, 1997) 
62 R. Kraakman/P. L. Davies/H. Hansmann/G. Hertig/K. J. Hopt/H. Kanda/E. B. Rock, 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 
63 For the example of a transnational regulatory framework of corporate environmental 
responsibilities of Multinational Chemical Enterprises, see the excellent study by Martin 
Herberg, Globalisierung und private Selbstregulierung (2007). 
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While this approach would place great emphasis on self-regulation, which 
would in turn create additional pressure on the regulatory systems with a 
mandatory-law approach to corporate law64, reflexive corporate 
governance would eventually emerge as a more adequate and flexible 
approach to corporate law regulation while – at the same time – not 
necessarily being insulated from ongoing assessments of this hybrid 
regulatory enterprise. Instead of reacting to the long, tiresome and 
frustrating harmonisation attempts in European company law with a turn 
to expert rule and market governance, reflexive corporate governance 
would allow for a clearer view of how political governance and corporate 
self-regulation can be mutually reinforcing and optimizing by constantly 
exposing regulatory choices and practices to scrutiny. The prime 
advantage of this approach would be that the regulatory challenges facing 
today’s transnational corporations could be assessed in correlation with the 
ongoing transformation of the political economies in which companies are 
legally constituted.65 A reflexive approach to corporate governance is even 
more pressing as the dramatically unfolding debate over a present 
transition from a ‘real economy’ to a ‘financial economy’66 suggests that 
neither a return to embedded capitalism corporate governance regulation 
nor a undeterred belief in the ‘end of history of corporate law’67 with its 
dubious promises of triumphant shareholder value maximization are a 
viable option. This means that what would previously have been an 
                                                 
64 See K. J. Hopt, 'Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe?' in J. A. 
McCahery,P. Moerland,T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneborg (eds.), Corporate Governance 
Regimes. Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
65 For the observation that even the ECJ’s decisions in Centros and others since 1999, 
which facilitated greater corporate mobility, have neither significantly induced more 
foreign incorporation nor more regulatory competition, see 
W.Bratton/J.McCahery/E.Vermeulen, ‘How does Corporate Mobility Affect 
Lawmaking? A Comparative Analysis, (2008), ECGI Law Working Paper No. 91/2008, 
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086667 
66 Frank Partnoy, ‘Financial Innovation and Corporate Law’, (2007), University of San 
Diego Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-89, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=976931 
67 H. Hansmann/R. Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law', (2001) 89 Geo. L. 
J. 439-468; H. Hansmann, 'How Close is the End of History?' (2006) 31 J. Corp. L. 745-
750 
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interest-pluralist assessment of choices in corporate governance regulation 
with view to allegedly opposed and eventually irreconcilable stakeholder 
interests can now be transposed into a more comprehensive and contextual 
analysis of the corporation’s functions, in particular, of its embeddedness 
in operational and regulatory practices. 
 
Against this background, it is important to contextualize ECGR again 
within the otherwise unfolding dynamics of hybrid governance modes 
within the EU. Echoing earlier legitimacy concerns with the OMC, recent 
explorations of ‘new’, ‘experimentalist’ or ‘informal’68 governance 
critically address the instrumentalisation of decentralised self-governance 
in service of a larger ‘whole’, the problem being that both the accessibility 
of the implied, overall political goal along with the now available 
regulatory modes are becoming ever more precarious.69 As Charles Sabel 
and Jonathan Zeitlin have recently argued, the persistent legitimacy 
critique vis à vis soft and hybrid governance forms ‘crucially overlooks 
the underlying architecture of public rule making in the EU: the 
fundamental design for law making, and the way this design transforms 
the distinct elements of EU governance by connecting them into a novel 
whole.’70 The particular challenge arising from these forms of governance 
is, however, the growing pressure on actors participating in multi-level 
norm-creation processes to effectively identify the desired output and the 
coordination elements necessary for its realization. ‘The difficulty […] 
and the open secret of administrative law in both the EU and the USA, is 
that it is very often – regularly? – the case that no actor among those 
seeking to coordinate their efforts has a precise enough idea of the goal 
either to give precise instructions to the others or reliably recognise when 
their actions do or don’t serve the specified end.’71 In defense of what they 
call ‘experimentalist governance’, Sabel and Zeitlin extrapolate the 
legitimacy potentials of the ‘recursive redefinition of means and ends’ at 
                                                 
68 B. Eberlein/E. Grande, 'Beyond Delegation: Transnational Regulatory Regimes and the 
EU Regulatory State', (2005) 12 J. Eur. Publ. Pol. 89 
69 G.Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities & Pitfalls of 
Integration by Stealth (Oxford University Press, 2005) 
70 C. F. Sabel/J. Zeitlin, 'Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governance in the EU', (2008) 14 European L.J. 271-327, at 273 
71 Id., at 304 
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its heart by pointing out that under conditions of complex regulatory 
challenges an accountability model designed for a hierarchical principal-
agent relation is no longer adequate.72 Instead of assessing whether the 
agent did comply with a rule set by the principle, the agent is expected to 
provide ‘a good explanation for choosing, in the light of fresh knowledge, 
one way of advancing a common, albeit somewhat indeterminate project 
(as all projects are).’ […] Correspondingly, ‘[p]eer review becomes in turn 
dynamic accountability – accountability that anticipates the transformation 
of rules in use – and dynamic accountability becomes the key to 
“anomalous” administrative law [...].’73 The authors certainly recognise 
the limitations of the proposed endorsement of experimental governance, 
when they address the tension between the described participatory 
processes and democracy. But, their response is radical: while 
acknowledging the unavailability of a large scale democratic justification 
of the new system of governance, Sabel and Zeitlin emphasise how 
accountability-through-peer review can help destabilise ‘entrenched forms 
of authority – starting with, but not limited to technical authority.’74 
Importantly, they argue, the ‘diffusion of procedural commitments to 
transparency and participation in EU networked governance has had a 
democratising destabilisation effect in terms of stimulating demands to 
widen the circle of actors and alternatives involved in policy making at the 
national as well as the European level.’75  
 
This short discussion of EU ‘experimentalist’ governance modes points to 
the deeper complexity of tying an exploration of ECGR into the context of 
European governance. As the following case study will illustrate, the 
particular challenge arises from the intersection of national and 
transnational law making in an overall hotly contested regulatory area. 
There has been and continues to be considerable pressure on European 
corporations to become more attractive to foreign investors, first, by both 
changing core corporate governance rules and, second, by substantively 
expanding its disclosure portfolio. The peculiar trajectory of the European 
                                                 
72 Id. 
73 Id., at 305 
74 Id., at 313 
75 Id., at 315-316 
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attempt at introducing standards regarding the disclosure of executive 
compensation can be used to highlight the persistent tension between ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ EU governance. 
 
III. THE CASE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
A. BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: GOVERNANCE BY EXPERTISE 
 
While it has oft been repeated that there is no universally optimal system 
of corporate governance and that, despite upheld claims of an ‘end of 
history in corporate law’, there is much likelihood for continued 
divergences and persistence of distinct regimes, the case of management 
compensation illustrates the changing dynamics within the ECGR process. 
As hard law harmonization in the area of company law seems to be out of 
reach76, soft law harmonization might prove to be a far more efficient 
approach to regulatory change in that respect. While company law experts 
in the 1970s harbored highest hopes for a flourishing harmonization 
program of company laws in Europe77, the ensuing decades have received 
a much more reserved assessment. Over time it became apparent that 
harmonization could not be achieved in many central areas of company 
law given the substantial, political, socio-economic and legal differences 
of company law organization in the European member states.78 Instead, 
the European Commission as the principle initiator of European wide 
company law legislation pursued various projects in the area of capital 
                                                 
76  J. Wouters, 'European Company Law: Quo Vadis?' (2000) 37 Common Market Law 
Review 257-307; S. Deakin, 'Regulatory Competition versus Reflexive Harmonisation in 
European Company Law', in D. C. Esty and D. Geradin (eds.), Regulatory Competition 
and Economic Integration. Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2001); P. 
Zumbansen, 'Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to Regulatory Competition 
in European Company Law', (2006) 12 Eur. L. J. 534-556 
77  See above all C. Schmitthoff, 'The Future of the European Company Law Scene', in C. 
Schmitthoff (eds.), The Harmonisation of European Company Law (The U.K. Nat'l. 
Committee of Comparative Law, 1973). 
78  See K. J. Hopt, 'Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe?' in J. A. 
McCahery,P. Moerland,T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneborg (eds.), Corporate Governance 
Regimes. Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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market and securities law, which would remain, until very recently, the 
only areas where Brussels could function as a law making motor.79 
Recently, much of this well-known status quo has come into greater 
movement. Among the events and developments that have contributed to a 
notable increase in legislative activity in this area are the already 
mentioned Societas Europaea and the Takeover Directive, the ECJ’s 
judgment in Centros and follow-up decisions in 2002, 2003 and 2004, and 
a fourth and in many ways very promising development, which had been 
initiated by the Commission amidst of the turmoil surrounding the 
deliberations around the Takeover Directive. In 2002, the Commission 
mandated the so-called High Level Group of Company Law Experts under 
the chairmanship of Dutch law professor, Jaap Winter, to prepare a 
comprehensive report to facilitate the Directive’s adoption.80 Shortly after 
the Group had submitted its report, the Commission asked for another 
study. This mandate constituted the starting point for an entirely new wave 
of European company law making. When the Winter-Group submitted its 
Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on A Modern 
Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe in November 2002 
(the “Winter 2” report), it did no less than present an outline, blueprint and 
wish-list for future legislative projects for the European company law 
legislator.81 Based on the Winter 2 report, the Commission drafted a 
concise outline of future legislative projects, the 'Modernising Company 
Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A 
Plan to Move Forward', the so-called Action Plan.82 Given the wide range 
                                                 
79  For an overview of these initiatives, see the excellent account by J. Wouters, 
'European Company Law: Quo Vadis?' (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 257-307; 
see also C. Villiers, European Company Law: Towards Democracy? (Ashgate, 1998); V. 
Edwards, EC Company Law (Oxford University Press, 1999) 
80  See the report J. Winter, 'Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on 
Issues related to Takeover Bids', (2002) at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/2002-01-hlg-
report_en.pdf 
81  J. Winter, 'Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on A Modern 
Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe', (2002) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report_en.pdf 
82  Document COM(2003)284, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2003_0284en01.pdf (last visited 5 June 
2008) 
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of issues addressed in its Action Plan, including, inter alia, corporate 
governance disclosure, strengthening of shareholder rights, modernizing 
corporate boards and co-ordinating the corporate governance efforts of 
member states83, the Commission invited public comments designed to 
assist it in the realization and implementation of the Action Plan’s 
agenda.84 When, in November 2003, the Directorate General Internal 
Market, the Commission’s subdivision responsible for company law, 
issued a synthesis of the responses received on the Action Plan85, it 
highlighted the overwhelming public support for the attempt embodied in 
the Action Plan to work towards a higher capital market efficiency and 
enhanced confidence in the market.86 It further reiterated that many 
participants in the consultation had stressed the necessity of a “fully 
integrated approach combining self-regulatory market solutions, adequate 
co-ordination of corporate governance codes and legislation where 
necessary” while recognizing that there cannot be a one-size-fits-all 
solution87 for corporate governance in Europe. In light of the continuing 
differing company law structures in Europe and the differences in the 
political economies among member states, it has been the consensus for 
some years now to not pursue a uniform corporate governance model but 
to enhance better transparency, communication and learning across 
member state borders.88 
                                                 
83  ACTION PLAN, supra, 10-17 
84  ACTION PLAN, supra, at 22 
85  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/governance-consult-
responses_en.pdf  (last visited 5 June 2008) 
86  SYNTHESIS, supra, preceding note, at 5. 
87  Id., at 6. 
88  According to EU Internal Market Commissioner, Charlie McCreevy, in a speech at the 
Corporate Governance Forum on 20 January 2005, there is neither need nor political will 
for a European wide corporate governance code: “We see no need for this at present and 
the adoption of such a code, if it were even possible, would be an inevitable and possibly 
messy political compromise, which would be unlikely to achieve full information for 
investors about the key corporate governance rules.” Available at:  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/26&format=HTM
L&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited 5 June 2008); see also ACTION 
PLAN, supra, at 11: “… no need for an EU corporate governance code.”  
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B. GOVERNANCE BY TRANSPARENCY  
 
Among the more recently pursued issues, however, by the lawmakers in 
Brussels, was a European wide regime for executive compensation. 
Already highlighted in the Winter 2 report89, the Action Plan of May 2003 
reemphasized the need for an initiative in this regard, which would 
basically be oriented around the central principles of shareholder approval 
and full, i.e. individualized, disclosure of the compensation schemes.90 
The Commission acted in this regard by issuing, on 14 December 2004, a 
Recommendation91: “fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration 
of directors of listed companies.”92 Under (3), the Commission highlighted 
the central role of the compensation scheme’s disclosure for good 
corporate governance: “The disclosure of accurate and timely information 
by the issuers of securities builds sustained investor confidence and 
constitutes an important tool for promoting sound corporate governance 
throughout the Community.”93 One of the remarkable features of this 
Recommendation was that it addressed questions of disclosure over any 
substantive issues related to directors’ remuneration. While the 
Recommendation subsequently addressed ‘remuneration policy’, 
‘remuneration of individual directors’, ‘share-based remuneration’, and 
‘information’, its central focus was on issues of transparency, disclosure 
and effective communication of the compensation details to shareholders 
and investors. The Commission addressed this Recommendation to the 
Member States94 and underlined the necessity of Member States taking 
                                                 
89  J. Winter, 'Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on A Modern 
Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe', (2002) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report_en.pdf, 9, 64-67 
90  ACTION PLAN, supra, at 16. 
91  A recommendation is a non-binding act by the Commission, pursuant to Art. 211 EC 
second indent, to “deliver opinions on matters dealt with this in this Treaty, if it expressly 
provides so or if the Commission considers it necessary.” 
92  2004/913/EC, of 14 December 2004, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_385/l_38520041229en00550059.pdf (last 
visited 5 June 2008) 
93  Id. 
94  Id., at 8.2. 
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“all appropriate measures” to ensure that companies registered in their 
jurisdictions have regard to this Recommendation.95 
 
To understand the particular dynamics of European law making, mention 
should be made of the discernible tension between Brussels’ political will 
to install a European wide regime on the one hand and its awareness of the 
numerous obstacles on the other: The Recommendation did in very 
explicit terms highlight the political embeddedness of the remuneration 
regime within the greater system of corporate governance. (2) of the 
Recommendation reads:  
 
‘…remuneration is one of the key areas where executive 
directors may have a conflict of interest and where due 
account should be taken of the interests of shareholders. 
Remuneration systems should therefore be subjected to 
appropriate governance controls, based on adequate 
information rights. In this respect, it is important to respect 
fully the diversity of corporate governance systems within 
the Community, which reflect different Member States’ 
views about the roles of corporations and of bodies 
responsible for the determination of policy on the 
remuneration of directors, and the remuneration of 
individual actors.’96 
 
This section expresses – in very simple terms – one of the most 
compelling features of European company law development, i.e. the great 
divergence between different company law traditions and histories.97 
While the history of ECGR has long been marked by struggles over 
                                                 
95  Id., Section 1, 1.1. 
96  European Commission, Recommendation 2004/913/EC, of 14 December 2004, (2) L 
385/55, at 55. 
97  See, for example, the brief accounts in Mark Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate 
Governance (Oxford University Press, 2003); see, from a political economy perspective, 
Ronald Dore, Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism (Oxford University Press, 
2000). 
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nationally distinct corporate governance regimes98, more recent accounts 
document the origins, causes and prospects for change.99 As already 
alluded to, the regulatory changes taking place in Brussels and in various 
Member States strongly reflect trends of parallel law making initiatives 
that on the one hand involve official norm-setting bodies such as the 
Commission and the Member States’ parliaments, and on the other, non-
state actors, expert commissions and private enterprises, complementing 
or accompanying the official law making processes through an amalgam 
of private, informal law making regimes.100 The particular challenge lies 
in the proliferation of sites, levels and forms of law making. As is shown 
next through a brief account of the German response to the European 
Recommendation, norms are sometimes the result of a highly intricate and 
unpredictable political process, during which the legislative initiative 
moves back and forth between domestic and supranational (Berlin – 
Brussels) and between in-official and official lawmakers (Expert 
Commission – Federal Legislator). 
 
The Commission’s Recommendation of December 2004 soon began to 
trigger reactions in Member States that – according to para. 8.1. of the 
Recommendation – were ‘invited to take the necessary measures to 
promote the application […] by 30 June 2006.’ According to the legal, 
non-binding nature of this regulatory instrument, Member States were 
invited ‘to notify the Commission of measures taken in accordance with 
the Recommendation in order to allow the Commission to monitor closely 
the situation and, on this basis, to assess the need for further measures.’ 
Not only did the Recommendation appear to be just about one of the most 
                                                 
98  See the classical account by C. Schmitthoff, 'The Future of the European Company 
Law Scene', in C. Schmitthoff (eds.), The Harmonisation of European Company Law 
(The U.K. Nat'l. Committee of Comparative Law, 1973); for a more recent observation 
and overview, see Hopt, ‘Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe?’, in: 
Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity (McCahery et al. eds. 
2002), 175. 
99  G.Hertig, ‘Western Europe’s Corporate Governance Dilemma’, in: (1996) Liber 
Amicorum Richard Buxbaum, at 265; P.Zumbansen, ‘European Corporate Law and 
National Divergences: The Case of Takeover Regulation’, in: (2004) 3 Wash U Glob St L 
Rev 867 (2004). 
100  See Baums, Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance, 2 German L.J. 
No. 12 (16 July 2001), available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=43 
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elegant, non-coercive and perhaps most permeating legal instruments in a 
highly politically contested regulatory environment, but it also might have 
offered just the right amount of pressure and substance to allow Member 
States to domestically pursue certain policies that otherwise might have 
proven too politically sensitive. 
 
At the core of this small case-study is the ‘law’ governing the disclosure of 
executive compensation in large, publicly traded business corporations. In 
recent years, there has been much development in this area, mostly 
initiated by public resistance against high pay packages for corporate 
leaders all too often now associated with excessive rent-seeking and 
fraudulent behaviour.101 Academic work alone on the issue of executive 
compensation – while having grown with the rise in real-world 
compensation during the 1990s bull market – has eventually outgrown this 
development.102 Even a superficial survey of the media and the scholarly 
literature suggests that the topic has not ceased to attract immense 
attention – from the academy and policy advisory circles to the media and 
the general public. The mood regarding the subject, however, might have 
– or so we hope – matured over time. With allegedly or potentially 
everyone driving a BMW in parts of California a few years ago, the 
perception of success in the market was that it was generally accompanied 
and documented by steep increases in management pay. With Bernard 
Ebbers convicted by a jury that remained utterly unimpressed by his pleas 
                                                 
101 See e.g. Fat Cats Feeding – Executive Pay, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2003, U.S. 
Edition, available at http://www.econ.umn.edu/~edgar/Economist.pdf (observing a 60% 
increase of media mentionings of “fat cats” between 2002 and 2003, making executive 
pay corporate governance’s greatest worry); CEO pay: Fat Cats turn to low fat, The 
Economist, March 5, 2005, print edition, p. 14 (warning against a continuation of 
“lavish” payments to CEO – including ousted ones); see also Sandeep Gopalan, Say on 
Pay, and the SEC Disclosure Rules: Expressive Law and CEO Compensation’, (2008) 
Pepperdine L. R. forthcoming, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096647 (last visited 
2 April 2008), 1: “Excessive CEO compensation is the cause celebre of current corporate 
law.” 
102  Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, Management and Control of the Modern Business 
Corporation: Executive Compensation and Takeovers, 69 U Chi L R 751, 753 (2002); L. 
A. Bebchuk/J. Fried, Pay Without Performance. The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive 
Compensation (Harvard University Press, 2004) 
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of ignorance vis-à-vis the fraudulent events in Enron103, today’s discussion 
about executive compensation seems again to be moving in another 
direction. Generally, the attitudes rank from skepticism to outright 
hostility with regard to the increasingly mediatized compensation 
programs.104 In the shadow of the dramatic and existential destruction of 
real capital and lifelong earnings with the collapse of the dot.com market 
in 2002105, it may come as little surprise that the discussion about 
management pay has again risen to the fore of public attention.106 
 
Academic debate has played a large role in giving voice to the various 
positions defended in this regard.107 William Bratton, in an insightful 
                                                 
103  Carrie Johnson, Ebbers Gets 25-Year Sentence For Role in WorldCom Fraud, 
WASHINGTON POST, 14 July 2005, at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/07/13/AR2005071300516.html; see also Johnson, Enron's Lay 
Dies Of Heart Attack. Convicted Founder Faced Life in Prison, Washington Post, 6 July 
2006, at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/07/05/AR2006070500523.html (reporting on heart attack of 
convicted former Enron chairman) (last visited 5 June 2008) 
104  See Knowledge @ Wharton: SEC’s Spotlight on Executive Pay. Will it make a 
Difference?, 8 February 2006; see also Executive Excess Report: CEO Pay Soars at 
Companies That Send Jobs Abroad, 22 September 2004, at:  
http://www.leftcenterleft.com/2004-09-22-outsoucing-and-ceo-pay.html (last visited 
5 June 2008)  
105  For a concise account of Enron’s downfall, see W. W. Bratton, 'Enron and the Dark 
Side of Shareholder Value', (2002) 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1275-1361; see also S. Deakin/S. J. 
Konzelmann, 'Learning from Enron', (2004) 12 Corporate Governance 134-142. 
106  Besides numerous instances of post-Enron press coverage, see from the academic 
debate Bebchuk et al., supra note 5; R. S. Thomas, 'Explaining the International CEO Pay 
Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?' (2004) 57 Vanderbilt Law Review 1171-1267; F. 
G. Snyder, 'More Pieces of the CEO Compensation Puzzle', (2003) 28 Delaware Journal 
of Corporate Law 129-183; M. C. Jensen/K. J. Murphy/E. G. Wruck, 'Remuneration: 
Where we've been, how we got here, what are the problems, and how to fix them', (2004) 
ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, WP No. 44/2004 . 
107  See only the grand attack by L. A. Bebchuk/J. Fried, Pay Without Performance. The 
Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation (Harvard University Press, 2004), and 
the response by W. W. Bratton, 'The Academic Tournament over Executive 
Compensation', (2005) 93 Cal. L. Rev. 1557-1584, at 1557: “Executive pay brings out the 
worst in the corporate-governance system. No economic theory tells us the terms of an 
“optimal” pay arrangement that penalizes failure while rewarding effort and merit in just 
the right increments. Absent such a first-best template, we must rely on contracting 
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discussion and critique of Bebchuk and Fried’s important book108, 
recognizes in this discussion not merely an opposition between anti- and 
pro-management arguments, but a “contest for shareholder capitalism's 
high ground.”109 This observation is particularly poignant as it highlights 
that within the quarrel, notably not so much over the amount of 
compensation paid, but over whether this amount is adequately tied to the 
management’s success in creating shareholder value, there ought still be 
some room to question the starting premise, namely whether one can 
continue to reasonably define the firm’s objective by no more and no less 
than shareholder value maximization.110 
 
A recurring argument at present deliberations over excessive CEO pay and 
the promises of controlling management behaviour through the addition of 
stock-driven components into their salary, is the contention that the issue 
of incentivizing management behaviour is really more complicated than 
that. Closely tied to this contention is the suggestion that the corporation is 
really more complicated than SHV theory might sometimes be taken to 
suggest.111 As a result, the connection made between CEO compensation 
                                                                                                                         
practice and experience to teach us on a trial-and-error basis.” This debate was mostly 
spurred by work done by Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy: see M. C. Jensen/K. J. 
Murphy, 'Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives', (1990) 98 J. Pol. Econ. 
225-264; on this debate and in reaction to Bebchuk and Fried, see recently Arthur Levitt, 
Corporate Culture and the Problem of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 749 
(2005); Bevis Longstreth, A Real World Critique of Pay Without Performance, 30 J. 
CORP. L. 767 (2005); S. M. Bainbridge, 'Executive Compensation: Who Decides?' (2005) 
83 Tex. L. Rev. 1615-1662; J. McConvill, 'Executive Compensation and Corporate 
Governance: Rising above the "Pay-for-Performance" Principle', (2006) 43 Am. Bus. L.J. 
413-438; J. McConvill, 'Positive Corporate Governance and its Implications for 
Executive Compensation', (2005) 6 German Law Journal 1777-1804. 
108  L. A. Bebchuk/J. Fried, Pay Without Performance. The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Executive Compensation (Harvard University Press, 2004) 
109  W. W. Bratton, 'The Academic Tournament over Executive Compensation', (2005) 93 
Cal. L. Rev. 1557-1584, at 1559 
110  Id., Bratton notes how, since the 1990s, a shift had taken place towards equity based 
CEO compensation, see id., at 1558, with references to M. C. Jensen/K. J. Murphy, 
'Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives', (1990) 98 J. Pol. Econ. 225-264. 
111 W. Lazonick/M. O'Sullivan, 'Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for 
Corporate Governance', in W. Lazonick and M. O'Sullivan (eds.), Corporate Governance 
and Sustainable Prosperity (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 
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packages and these CEOs’ success in creating shareholder value 
underscores the theoretical paradigm which sees the corporation, in rough 
terms, less as an entity channelling and collectivizing various interests, 
ranging from investors over employees and creditors to society at large, 
but as a nexus of contractual relations, entered into solely with the creation 
of shareholder profit in mind.112 In their description of how the model of 
the firm, emerging from the substitution of smaller, closely held and 
founder-governed enterprises by large, publicly traded corporations 
between 1880 and 1930113, placed the investors at the mercy of their 
managers, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means114 pointed out that the real 
challenge of reconciling the separation of ownership and control lay in a 
realistic and context-sensitive appreciation of the evolving political 
economy of corporate practice and corporate regulation. Here lies the key 
to undoing much of the more recent apprehension of Berle & Means as 
forerunners of the Shareholder Value paradigm.115 The disembedding of 
Berle & Means’ work occurred at a time of increasingly vibrant securities 
markets in the 1980s by reducing their argument to a mere call to arms in 
favour stronger management control in the interest shareholders. This 
move paid – and continues to pay – little to no attention to the 
contemporary political economy, management and ownership structure at 
                                                 
112  See M. C. Jensen, 'Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate 
Objective Function', (2001) 14 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance ; see already M. C. 
Jensen/W. H. Meckling, 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure (1976)', (2000) in: Jensen, A Theory of the Firm, Governance, 
Residual Claims, and Organizational Forms orig. in: 3 Journal of Financial Economics 
305-360 (1976), 83-135; A. A. Alchian/H. Demsetz, 'Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization', (1972) 62 American Economic Review 777-795. 
113  B. R. Cheffins, 'Corporations', in P. Cane and M. Tushnet (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press, 2003), 487 
114  A. A. Berle/G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 1932) 
115 For Berle’s early arguments supporting shareholder primacy, see: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., 
Non-cumulative Preferred Stocks, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 358 (1923); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., 
Problems of Non-Par Stocks, 25 Colum. L. Rev. 43 (1925); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., 
Participating Preferred Stock, 26 Colum. L. Rev. 303 (1926); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Non-
Voting Stock and Bankers Control, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 673 (1926); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., 
Corporate Powers as Power in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1931); and Adolf A. Berle, 
Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365 (1932). 
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the time of Berle & Means’ writing. 116 Berle & Means did not contend 
themselves with critiquing the challenge of the threatening ‘separation of 
ownership and control’. Instead, they made clear, and Berle would go to 
emphasize this point much more strongly some decades later117, that the 
corporation also ought to be understood as an eminently important social 
and political institution.118 While Berle and Means’s critique of an 
unaccountable management caste continued to dominate corporate law 
thinking for decades to come, since the 1960s, economists and corporate 
law authors asked why, if the separation of ownership and control thesis 
was correct, investors had not been deterred from buying corporate shares. 
Their response, which would prove to remain influential to our present 
day, was in short that besides internal governance and control mechanisms 
such as shareholder suits or the firing of executives, there were also 
alternative, outside control mechanisms. As advanced by Henry Manne119, 
but also by others writing on regulatory competition120, the market for 
corporate control would exercise a strong enough control mechanism to 
keep management within range.121 The management’s concern with how 
the market assesses the value of the firm under their guidance allegedly 
made it responsive to market opinion, most powerfully addressed by the 
selling of shares, reduction in value and acquisition/take-over by another 
corporation, which would regularly replace the incumbent management. 
                                                 
116 For a comprehensive assessment of the origins and trajectories of Berle & Means’ 
work, see Fenner Kennedy-Stewart, , A Critical History of The Early American 
Shareholder Primacy Discourse: A Fresh Examination of the Writings of Adolf A. Berle, 
E. Merrick Dodd and Henry G. Mann, Ph.D. Thesis Osgoode Hall Law School, draft ms., 
on file with author); see also Bratton, Tsuk Mitchell 
117  A. A. Berle, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1954) 
(highlighting the political power held and used by large corporations in the contemporary 
political economy). 
118  B. R. Cheffins, 'Corporations', in P. Cane and M. Tushnet (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press, 2003), at 487 
119  H. Manne, 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control', (1965) 73 Journal of 
Political Economy 110-120 
120  See, fundamentally, C. M. Tiebout, 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures', (1956) 64 
Journal of Political Economy 416-424. 
121  See hereto W. J. Carney, 'The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate 
Charters', (1997) 26 J. Leg. Stud. 303-329. 
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This emerging understanding of the separation of ownership and control-
problem prepared the ground for the rise of the nexus-of-contracts model 
of the corporation, which spread, aided by the rise of the law & economics 
movement, like a prairie fire through the 1970s corporate law arena.122 
The nexus-model shifted the focus significantly, but much of this shift had 
already been announcing itself with a growing disillusionment with 
government regulation all throughout the 1980s and 1990s123, culminating 
eventually in the rise to power by Margaret Thatcher in the United 
Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States. The contractarian 
model, thus, fit smoothly into a larger political climate where emphasis 
was placed on individual responsibility, private ordering and the greater 
burden on the state to justify any intervention. To be sure, a considerable 
amount of critique was and continues to be mounted against the 
contractarian premises of corporate governance.124 What matters for our 
discussion, however, is not the final resolution of the debate over the 
nexus-model of the corporation, but the recognition of this model as an 
important theoretical background for any concept of non-state regulation 
of the corporation. This section on the development of corporate law 
theory already indicates that there can be no adequate understanding of the 
regulatory framework for the corporation without an exposure to the 
various lines of contestation of the firm itself.125 In fact, what makes the 
discussion of executive compensation so interesting, and Bratton’s 
observation even more insightful, is that we can recognize a set of much 
more fundamental questions that underlie the different contentions about 
competences to determine compensation packages. These questions 
concern our understanding and concept of the corporation as a regulatory 
object, subject and space. 
 
                                                 
122  D. M. Branson, 'A Corporate Paleontologist's Look at Law and Economics in the 
Seventh Circuit', (1989) 65 Chicago Kent Law Review 745-756, 745 
123  B. R. Cheffins, 'Corporations', in P. Cane and M. Tushnet (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press, 2003), 494 
124  See, e.g., W. W. Bratton/J. A. McCahery, 'Incomplete Contracts Theories of the Firm 
and Comparative Corporate Governance', (2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law Article 7 
[p. 1-38] 
125  See, hereto, P. Ireland, 'Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth', (2005) 
68 Modern Law Review 49-81. 
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One particular element of the current discussion and our reason to draw 
from the example of executive compensation for our argument is the 
particular dynamics of regulatory politics in this area. As already 
indicated, we can note an interesting shift away from the material issues of 
how much CEOs are being paid, who sets the compensation packages and 
how justified these payments are126, to questions regarding the regulatory 
framework of executive compensation. While the extreme amounts being 
distributed to top management surely remain on academics’127, policy 
makers’ and the public’s mind, an intriguing discussion has emerged 
which addresses this problem from another perspective. It is this 
perspective on the regulatory structure of executive compensation, the 
related competences128 and now, more importantly, its disclosure that 
ought to be moved into the centre of attention.129 While the regulation and 
disclosure of CEO pay figures as a means of controlling management, be 
that on a running, day-to-day basis or in the context of corporate 
acquisitions130, remains an interesting aspect of the present discussion, an 
even more fruitful approach to understanding the regulatory dynamics of 
executive compensation would be to focus on how the various forms of 
corporate disclosure can be read as new means of regulating the company 
as such.131 
                                                 
126  See, e.g., Susan J. Stabile, One for A, Two for B, and Four Hundred for C: The 
Widening Gap in Pay Between Executives and Rank and File Employees, 36 MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 115, 115-18 (2002). 
127  W. W. Bratton, 'The Academic Tournament over Executive Compensation', (2005) 93 
Cal. L. Rev. 1557-1584, 1561: “CEO compensation has ballooned (9-10), with total 
remuneration increasing by more than eleven times in the past thirty years.” 
128  See S. M. Bainbridge, 'Executive Compensation: Who Decides?' (2005) 83 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1615-1662. 
129  L. A. Bebchuk/J. Fried, Pay Without Performance. The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Executive Compensation (Harvard University Press, 2004), 212-3; S. M. Bainbridge, 
'Executive Compensation: Who Decides?' (2005) 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1615-1662, 1655 
(noting the impediments in particular for small shareholders to make effective use of the 
wealth of disclosed information, leaving mostly professional, institutional investors to 
make informed choices on the basis of corporate disclosure) 
130  Bainbridge, id. 
131 For a comparative overview, see L. Enriques/P. Volpin, 'Corporate Governance 
Reforms in Continental Europe', (2007) 21 J. Econ. Persp. 117-140, 132-5. 
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The latter feeds into a parallel, contemporary debate about mandatory vs. 
voluntary disclosure, a discussion, which emerged in the aftermath of 
government regulation after the financial scandals of firms such as 
ENRON, WorldCom and Tyco. Here we find ourselves again in the midst 
of longstanding and dramatically urgent deliberations over state vs. market 
based approaches to securities regulation.132 Central to this discussion over 
the merits or drawbacks of voluntary vs. mandatory disclosure is the 
fundamental recognition of disclosure and transparency as regulatory 
means. As recently reiterated by Cynthia Williams, the recognition of 
disclosure as a regulatory instrument, certainly, goes back a long time, at 
least to the work done by Brandeis, Berle and Means.133 The present 
discussion focuses predominantly on the positive effects (or, the lack 
thereof) of the U.S. government’s regulatory initiatives after ENRON, 
                                                 
132  R. Romano, 'Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation', 
(1998) 107 Yale L. J. 2359-2430; R. Romano, 'Less is More: Making Institutional 
Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance', in J. A. 
McCahery,P. Moerland,T. Raaijmakers and L. Renneborg (eds.), Corporate Governance 
Regimes. Convergence and Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2002); S. Choi, 
'Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal', (2000) 88 Cal. L. Rev. 279-
334; see, hereto, R. A. Prentice, 'The Inevitability of a Strong SEC', (2006) Cornell L. 
Rev. 775-839, at 781: “A company can benefit when it develops a reputation for 
disclosing accurate information to investors. In theory, then, we should not need an SEC 
to enforce voluntary, accurate disclosure.  Corporate practices of the last decade or so, 
however, stand in marked contrast to economic theory.” Prentice, therefore, argues 
against models of voluntary disclosure and even regulatory competition. See, id., at 816: 
“In the end, voluntary full disclosure seldom occurs in the real world.” 
133  C. A. Williams, 'The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency', (1999) 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197-1311, 1211 with references to L. D. 
Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It (Harper's Torch Books, 
1914), and to A. A. Berle/G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
1932). But, see also J. W. Landis, The Administrative Process (Yale University Press, 
1938) (highlighting the necessity of a strong SEC to regulate corporate disclosure 
practices). 
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most notably the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002134, which has subsequently 
come under heavy fire.135 
 
What is to be taken from this discussion for our present inquiry into the 
conditions of ECGR as transnational legal pluralism is the focus on the 
idea of regulation through disclosure, which constitutes an alternative to 
substantial regulatory approaches. The example of disclosure of corporate 
earnings allows us to explore the intertwining of substantive standards and 
formal procedures, as it plays out in this area in a most intriguing way. 
Whereas the substantial issue at hand would primarily be what would be 
considered an adequate compensation scheme, the secondary issue would 
be who – investors, directors, managers – should be authorized to establish 
the amount of compensation to be allocated to a company’s top 
management.136 The first issue would be the substantive question 
regarding the adequacy of the compensation package, while the second 
issue would go to the heart of the corporate governance problem, namely, 
                                                 
134  Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act, 
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15, 18 U.S.C. 
135  Jenny Strasburg, ‘Corporate Backlash over Sarbanes-Oxley’, San Francisco 
Chronicle, March 23, 2005, available at: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/03/23/BUGVCBR78D43.DTL; Tracey L. Coenen, 
‘Reflections on Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002’, Wisconsin L. J., published 13 August 2007, 
available at: http://www.sequence-
inc.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=43&Itemid=22 (last visited 5 
June 2008); R. Romano, 'The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance', (2005) 114 Yale L. J. 1521-1611 (noting that the Federal Government’s 
legislative initiative leading up to the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act encroached upon the 
States’ competence in corporate law making, calling the Act “not just a considerable 
change in law, but also a departure in the mode of regulation. The federal regime had 
until then consisted primarily of disclosure requirements rather than substantive corporate 
governance mandates, which were traditionally left to state corporate law.” (id., at 1523); 
see also H. T. Hollister, ''Shock Therapy' for Aktiengesellschaften: Can the Sarbanes-
Oxley Certification Requirements Transform German Corporate Culture, Practice and 
Prospects?' (2005) 25 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 453-484, 463: “… corporate-governance 
regulation in the 1930's was a matter of state, not national law, so the SEC's task for both 
U.S. and foreign corporations was one of requiring financial reports, rather than 
mandating governance structures.” 
136  In most U.S. corporate law jurisdictions, the directors of a corporation have the 
competence to determine the amount of compensation for managers, see  
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who inside of the firm gets to determine CEO pay packages and how can 
investors (and, the firm) be protected against management’s self-dealing. 
Apart from these substantive issues, however, lies a formal one. The 
formal issue is concerned with how executive compensation is regulated, 
in other words, whether the regulation of executive compensation ought to 
be assumed by the government or whether it could be left to private 
ordering. 
 
A case in point for this development is the legislation introducing 
disclosure obligations for German stock corporations adopted in 2005.137 
This legislation is particularly interesting when seen in light of the 
ongoing corporate governance reforms in Germany on the one hand and 
the initiatives in this regard from the Commission. While Germany is 
currently undergoing what is without doubt the most comprehensive 
overhaul of company and securities law reform in decades138, the 
dynamics of this process can only adequately be assessed in light of the 
greater discussions about the pressure on “Germany Inc” in a globally 
integrated market environment where investor confidence is key to gaining 
                                                 
137  See the GESETZ ÜBER DIE OFFENLEGUNG DER VORSTANDSVERGÜTUNGEN [VorstOG] 
(Federal CEO Earnings Disclosure Act) of August 3, 2005, published in: 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBl] (Federal Gazette) 2005 Vol. I, p. 2267 (available at: 
http://www.bmj.bund.de/files/-/1382/VorstOG.pdf (last visited 5 June 2008); for the draft 
and the ensuing discussion, see Bundesministerium der Justiz (Federal Ministry of 
Justice), Press release, 11 March 2005, Eckpunkte eines Gesetzentwurfs “Individulisierte 
Offenlegung der Gehälter von Vorstandsmitgliedern von Aktiengesellschaften” 
vorgestellt, available online at: 
http://www.bmj.de/enid/0,0/Presse/Pressemitteilungen_58.html?druck=1&presseartikel_i
d=1906 (last visited 5 June 2008); see also „Grüne bemängeln Gesetzentwurf...”, 
NETZEITUNG, 11 March 2005 (citing the critique voiced by members of the Green Party 
(Die Grünen) targeting the option for the general shareholder assembly adopting a non-
disclosure possibility for management earnings with a ¾ majority). 
138  For recent overviews, see U. Noack/D. Zetzsche, 'Corporate Governance in Germany: 
The Second Decade, Center for Business & Corporate Law (CBC) Research Paper 
Series', (2005) CBC WP No. 0010 [http://ssrn.com/abstract=646761]; P. C. Leyens, 
'German Company Law: Recent Developments and Future Challenges', (2005) 6 German 
L. J. 1407-1408; U. Noack/D. A. Zetzsche, 'Germany's Corporate and Financial Law 
2007: (Getting) Ready for Competition', (2007) CBC-RPS No. 0028 
[http://ssrn.com/abstract=986357] (highlighting the current dynamism of ‘service-
oriented law making and innovative reforms’)  
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access to capital from large institutional investors.139 It is necessary to 
understand the particular quality of contemporary law reform in corporate 
governance in order to fully grasp the regulatory options available to the 
participants. As we shall see, this regulatory field is neither purely public 
nor private in nature. The intricate interaction between the government, a 
semi-public, semi-private expert commission, and industry representatives 
in a far-reaching public debate over mandatory vs. voluntary disclosure of 
CEO earnings, which we will describe in the following, leads us to the 
thesis that, rather than having the possibility to decide clearly in favour or 
against mandatory (or, voluntary) disclosure, the outcome of the struggle 
depends in reality on a complex and even unpredictable set of 
developments taking place in a volatile and hybrid regulatory 
environment. This means that rather than being a straight-forward example 
of either a radically decentralized and de-hierarchised law making 
enterprise or a top-down, government-made legal regime, the particular 
development of law making in Germany in this area illustrates the absence 
of clear-cut solutions. As has already become clear from the preceding 
section concerning the contested legal nature of corporate governance 
codes, the regulation of CEO compensation disclosure in Germany turns 
out to be a further illustration of an intricate intertwining of public and 
private ordering. 
 
Executive compensation came onto the German corporate law reform 
agenda mainly under the pressure of an international, globe-spanning 
discussion over excessive CEO pay packages, management self-dealing, 
underscoring the investor’s ultimate powerlessness to effectively constrain 
fraudulent and otherwise illicit behavior among managers. As such, 
executive compensation is yet another example of an issue that emerges in 
a particular regulatory, political and cultural context, but attains allegedly 
universal contours when entering a common debate among academics and 
policy makers around the world. As has become clear in the ongoing 
discussion over the convergence and divergence of different corporate 
governance models, many issues (such as outside directors and auditors, 
takeovers or regulatory competition), which had once been remembered in 
                                                 
139  J. W. Cioffi, 'Corporate Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics, and the 
Foundations of Finance Capitalism in the United States and Germany', (2005) 01 CLPE 
Research Paper Series (www.comparativeresearch.net)  
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the concrete context in which they originated140, have come to occupy our 
minds as unavoidable challenges for law-makers and regulatory theory 
worldwide.141 In order, however, to understand how a corporate 
governance idea, principle or theory enters into an existing regulatory 
framework and paradigm, we need to shed light on this paradigm in its 
greater embeddedness rather than treating it simply as an autonomous, 
isolated tabula rasa, just waiting to be filled with strange words.142 
 
The notion of embeddedness, however, is certainly anything but easy to 
concretize. Against the background of contemporary revivals and 
reassessments of Karl Polanyi’s seminal work on the “evolution of the 
‘market pattern’.143 What has been triggering the recently reawakened 
interest in Polanyi is the still unsatisfactory analysis and realization of the 
concept of embeddedness. It is thus no surprise that economic 
sociologists144 and corporate law scholars with a distinct interest in the 
                                                 
140  R. J. Gilson, 'The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the 
European Corporate Governance Environment', in K. J. Hopt and E. Wymeersch (eds.), 
European Takeovers. Law and Practice (Butterworths, 1992); J. C. Coffee Jr., 'The 
Future as History: The Prospects of Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its 
Implications', (1999) 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641-707; D. Charny, 'Competition among 
Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to 
the Bottom" in the European Communities', (1991) 32 Harvard International Law 
Journal (Harv. Int'l L.J.) 423-456 
141  See the critique hereto by D. M. Branson, 'The Very Uncertain Prospect of 'Global' 
Convergence in Corporate Governance', (2001) 34 Corn. Int'l L. J. 321-362 
142  Hereto, see, e.g., H. T. Hollister, ''Shock Therapy' for Aktiengesellschaften: Can the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Certification Requirements Transform German Corporate Culture, 
Practice and Prospects?' (2005) 25 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 453-484, with regard to the 
certification requirements for foreign private issuers created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
See id., at 463: “An examination of basic German corporate structure, practices and 
values provides crucial context for the German objections to the certification 
requirements.”  
143 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of our 
Time (Beacon Press, 1944), 56-67, 57: “The market pattern […] is capable of creating a 
specific institution, namely the market. Ultimately, that is why the control of the 
economic system by the market is of overwhelming consequence to the whole 
organization of society: it means no less than the running of society as an adjunct to the 
market.” 
144 J. Beckert, 'The Great Transformation of Embeddedness. Karl Polanyi and the New 
Economic Sociology', (2007) Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung/Max-
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embedding factor of ‘culture’145 emphasize the need of taking a closer 
look at the way in which the notion of embeddedness can help assess the 
contemporary dynamics between formal and informal rule making. Above 
all, this research, itself developing against the background of a 
longstanding interest in ‘social norms’146, points to the distinct challenges 
arising in the area of comparative legal research where the analytical lens 
is not wide enough to capture the complex structure of such ‘semi-
autonomous’ fields, as they are emerging along functionally differentiated, 
organizational and regulatory areas. 
 
The “shocks” that have been hitting German147 and European148 corporate 
governance and that by many accounts demand a no less than radical 
reform of existing laws149, appear in a different light when perceived from 
a regulatory perspective. In this regard, executive compensation becomes 
an example of how top-down law making approaches alternate, interact 
and intertwine with attempts to promote corporate self-regulation, non-
                                                                                                                         
Planck-Institute for the Study of Societies, MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/1 ; see already M. 
Granovetter, 'Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness', 
(1985) 91 American Journal of Sociology 481-510; M. Granovetter, 'The Impact of Social 
Structure on Economic Outcomes', (2005) 19 J. Econ. Persp. 33-50 
145 A. N. Licht/C. Goldschmidt/S. H. Schwartz, 'Culture, Law, and Corporate 
Governance', (2005) 25 Int'l Rev. Law and Econ. 229-255 (taking issue with LLSV’s 
reliance on ‘legal families’ to explain corporate governance divergences); A. N. Licht, 
'Social Norms and the Law: A Social Institutional Approach', (2005) Working Paper 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=710621, 52: It should be clear that dynamic processes are always 
at work. Cultural value dimensions constitute the backbone of a constantly developing 
body of social norms.” 
146 R. Ellickson, 'Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta 
County', (1986) 38 Stan. L. Rev. 623; L. Bernstein, 'Opting out of the Legal System: 
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry', (1992) 21 J. Leg. Stud. 115-
157 
147  See Hollister, “Shock Therapy” for Aktiengesellschaften: Can the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Certification Requirements Transform German Corporate Culture, Practice and 
Prospects?, 25 NW. J INT’L L & BUS 453 (2004) 
148  G. Hertig, 'Western Europe's Corporate Governance Dilemma', in T. Baums,K. J. 
Hopt and N. Horn (eds.), Corporations, Capital Markets and Business in the Law. Liber 
Amicorum Richard M. Buxbaum (Kluwer Law International, 2000), at 266. 
149  T. Baums, 'Company Law Reform in Germany', (2003) 3 J. Corp. L. Stud. 181-189 
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official norm setting and alternative law enforcement mechanisms. These 
choices between alternative regulatory instruments and the concrete 
evolution of public, private and hybrid public-private ordering are deeply 
embedded in a nation’s political economy and regulatory environment.150 
No assessment of their legal nature, their compatibility with an existing 
institutional and normative regulatory environment, up to questions of 
compliance and enforceability can be carried out without reference to a 
specific context. It should already have become clear that in emerging 
areas of transnational law making, these contexts can increasingly be de-
territorialized.151 But, in many cases, our interest remains fixated on the 
emergence of new legal regimes out of existing normative infrastructures. 
Just as much specific consumer protection instruments might be 
influenced by acquired views on how a specific consumer protection 
philosophy should be developed and promoted within a specific political 
economy152, other emerging normative regimes show the same degree of 
embeddedness. Corporate governance codes, given their complex and in 
many ways still not entirely resolved legal nature, will have to be 
interpreted with at least a view to the particular legal and regulatory 
environment in which they were conceptualized and developed. 
“Corporate governance codes function within a given legal environment. 
The interaction with the legal system is a complex matter that differs 
considerably from state to state, both due to differences in the legal status 
of the codes, but also due to differences in the environing legal system.”153 
                                                 
150  See most recently K. Ibata-Arens/J. Dierkes/D. Zorn, 'Guest Editors' Introduction: 
Theoretical Introduction to the Special Issue on the Embedded Enterprise', (2006) 7 
Enterprise & Society 1-18, at 2: “Embeddedness connotes the complex interrelatedness of 
actors within their social, political, and cultural environments.” Hereto, see also M. 
Granovetter, 'Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness', 
(1985) 91 American Journal of Sociology 481-510; P. Zumbansen, 'Varieties of 
Capitalism and the Learning Firm. Corporate Governance and Labor in the Context of 
Contemporary Developments in European and German Company Law [CLPE Research 
Paper No. 3/2007 and University of Cambridge, Centre for Business Research Working 
Paper 347, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=993910]', (2007) 8 Eur. Bus. Org. L. 
Rev. [EBOR] 467-496 
151  See, supra, II. 
152  See, e.g., G. Howells/T. Wilhelmsson, 'EC Consumer Law: Has it Come of Age?' 
(2003) 28 European Law Review 370-388. 
153  E. Wymeersch, 'Enforcement of Corporate Governance Codes', (2005) ECGI Law 
Working Paper No. 46/2005 , at 2 
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Research by sociologists, lawyers, cultural psychologists and economic 
historians on evolution, path dependency and embeddedness suggests that 
the relationships between regulatory instruments and causal outcomes 
cannot adequately be captured by the use of dichotomies. Often-employed 
dichotomies include the state and the market154, markets and 
hierarchies155, public and private156 or, the firm and its environment. “Such 
dichotomies construct divisions between two opposing, mutually exclusive 
categories. Dichotomy formulations always involve a binary choice, which 
limits the ability to measure complexity.”157 These findings not only 
coincide with the critique put forward by legal sociologists and legal 
theorists against the use of dichotomies such as market vs. state, or public 
vs. private when assessing new regulatory structures in a transforming 
welfare state158, but also contribute to and greatly enrich the work done by 
Varieties of Capitalism scholars referred to above.159 The lessons learned 
                                                 
154  See the brilliant critique by R. L. Hale, 'Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly 
Non-Coercive State', (1923) 38 Political Science Quarterly 470-494. 
155  O. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies. Analysis and Antitrust Implications (Free 
Press, 1975); see hereto the critique  by M. Granovetter, 'Economic Action and Social 
Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness', (1985) 91 American Journal of Sociology 
481-510, 489-490 (critiquing Williamson for underestimating the role played by personal 
relations and obligations as well as institutional arrangements in encouraging trust and 
discouraging malfeasance); see the elaboration and expansion by J. Beckert, 'The Great 
Transformation of Embeddedness. Karl Polanyi and the New Economic Sociology', 
(2007) Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung/Max-Planck-Institute for the 
Study of Societies, MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/1 . 
156  A. C. Cutler, 'Artifice, Ideology and Paradox: the Public/Private Distinction in 
International Law', (1997) 4 Review of International Political Economy 261-285 
157  K. Ibata-Arens/J. Dierkes/D. Zorn, 'Guest Editors' Introduction: Theoretical 
Introduction to the Special Issue on the Embedded Enterprise', (2006) 7 Enterprise & 
Society 1-18, at 7 
158  See, e.g., G. Frankenberg, 'Shifting Boundaries: The Private, the Public, and the 
Welfare State', in M. B. Katz and C. Sachße (eds.), The Mixed Economy of Social 
Welfare (Nomos, 1996); N. Fraser/L. Gordon, 'Dekodierung von "Abhängigkeit". Zur 
Genealogie eines Schlüsselbegriffs des amerikanischen Wohlfahrtsstaats', (1993) 26 KJ 
306-323; P. Zumbansen, 'Quod Omnes Tangit: Globalization, Welfare Regimes and 
Entitlements', in E. Benvenisti and G. Nolte (eds.), The Welfare State, Globalization, and 
International Law (Springer, 2003), 147-149. 
159  See, supra. 
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so far from work done in employment160, corporate161 and social welfare 
law162 teach us about the embeddedness of regulatory regimes in 
historically grown cultural, political and economic institutions. As we 
expand the traditional Varieties of Capitalism lens to study the evolving 
nature of the identified liberal and coordinated market regimes163, in 
particular the shifting weights between political sides164 and the intricate 
and unpredictable interaction between public and private actors165, we can 
begin to grasp the challenge put before us through the cited examples of 
regulatory change. We are thus slowly beginning to reach beyond the 
historical origins of particular institutions, their alleged starting points and 
ensuing trajectories, lock-ins and aberrations166 to look more closely at the 
particular dynamics of regulatory change occurring both with regard to the 
institutions and the normative content that can be found to govern a 
particular field. 
 
                                                 
160  K. Thelen, 'Varieties of Labor Politics in the Developed Democracies', in P. A. Hall 
and D. Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism (Oxford University Press, 2001) 
161  J. W. Cioffi/S. S. Cohen, 'The state, law and corporate governance: the advantage of 
forwardness', in S. S. Cohen and G. Boyd (eds.), Corporate Governance and 
Globalization. Long Range Planning Issues (Edward Elgar, 2000) 
162  P. Manow, 'Welfare State Building and Coordinated Capitalism in Japan and 
Germany', in W. Streeck and K. Yamamura (eds.), The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism 
(Cornell University Press, 2001) 
163  On this distinction, see foremost P. A. Hall/D. Soskice, 'An Introduction to Varieties 
of Capitalism', in P. A. Hall and D. Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism. The 
Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, 2001) 
164  J. W. Cioffi, 'Corporate Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics, and the 
Foundations of Finance Capitalism in the United States and Germany', (2006) 7 German 
L. J. 533-562 
165  P. Zumbansen, 'The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and Labor Law', 
(2006) 13 Indiana Journal of Global Studies 261-312 
166  M. J. Roe, 'Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics', (1996) 109 Harv. L. Rev. 
641-668 
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C. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
REFORM IN GERMANY  
1. GOVERNING ‘GERMANY INC.’ 
 
For the longest time, the governing norm for executive compensation in 
German stock corporations has been sec. 87 (1) Aktiengesetz (Stock 
Corporation Act). It reads: 
 
“In setting up the total earnings for each member of the 
Management Board (Salary, Profit participation, 
Compensation, Insurances, Provisions and auxiliary 
remunerations of any type), the Supervisory Board must 
ensure that the total earnings remain appropriate in 
relation to the tasks of the Manager and the state of the 
company. This correspondingly is true also of retirement 
pay, payments to heirs and related payments.” 167 
 
The norm’s most prominent and governing features are both its 
explicitness and implicitness. The law demands that the remuneration of 
members of a stock corporation’s executive, or managing board must be 
appropriate (angemessen) to the tasks of the board member and to the 
situation of the company (Lage der Gesellschaft). That is its explicitness. 
The implicitness of the norm can be seen in its silence as regards further 
specification and substantiation of this appropriateness. While much 
discussion has taken place with regard to the level of appropriateness in 
executive pay, this has been comparatively been less than elsewhere. 
Largely responsible for the comparative acquiescence of the wider public 
in what German managers earn might be attributed to a simultaneous 
awareness that the German Vorstandssprecher and Vorstandsmitglieder 
                                                 
167  German original: Der Aufsichtsrat hat bei der Festsetzung der Gesamtbezüge des 
einzelnen Vorstandsmitglieds (Gehalt, Gewinnbeteiligungen, Aufwandsentschädigungen, 
Versicherungsentgelte, Provisionen und Nebenleistungen jeder Art) dafür zu sorgen, daß 
die Gesamtbezüge in einem angemessenen Verhältnis zu den Aufgaben des 
Vorstandsmitglieds und zur Lage der Gesellschaft stehen. Dies gilt sinngemäß für 
Ruhegehalt, Hinterbliebenenbezüge und Leistungen verwandter Art. [my translation, PZ] 
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(CEOs and managers) generally earn strikingly less than their peers in 
New York or Los Angeles.168  
 
While in Germany, as in elsewhere, financial scandals in recent years have 
led to public concern about excessive management pay169, law making 
activity in the last two years has remarkably focused less on substance 
than on procedure, in particular on the rules governing disclosure of 
management earnings. German stock corporations are obliged under sec. 
285 No. 9 Handelsgesetzbuch (Commercial Code) to identify in their 
annual report the collective sum of compensation earned by the 
collectivity, be it the board of managers or the supervisory council. While 
this obligation extends to different categories of remuneration – salary, 
boni and options – it used to stop short of demanding disclosure of 
individual earnings of board members. 
 
In the meantime, following the installation of the Corporate Governance 
Code Commission under the Chairmanship of Gerhard Cromme in 
2001170, which had presented a Code in February 2002, some advance was 
made towards pushing German industry to disclose individualized 
corporate earnings. In the aftermath, however, policy makers, industry 
leaders and lobbyists disagreed about the need to comply with the Code’s 
                                                 
168  Finfacts Ireland, 30 March 2006: Global Executive Pay 2006; Senior executives in the 
US earn the highest salaries, 
http://www.finfacts.com/irelandbusinessnews/publish/article_10005367.shtml; Jay W. 
Lorsch, ‘Rising CEO Pay: What Directors Should Do’, Harvard Business School 
Working Knowledge, 13 August 2006, http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5490.html: “Ask any 
thoughtful corporate board member what they are most concerned about these days, and 
it is not Sarbanes-Oxley. It is CEO pay.” (last visited 5 June 2008) 
169  Ulrich Papendick, Welche Konzernchefs zuviel verdienen [which corporate bosses 
earn too much, transl. PZ], MANAGER MAGAZIN, 23 June 2005, available at: 
http://www.manager-
magazin.de/unternehmen/vorstandsgehaelter/0,2828,361510,00.html (last visited 5 June 
2008); Europa Vergleich: Deutsche Bosse verdienen zu viel [European comparison: 
German bosses earn too much], DER SPIEGEL, 23 June 2006, available at: 
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,422959,00.html (last visited 5 June 2008). 
170 Effective 30 June 2008, the chairmanship will be transferred, see Press Release of 5 
June 2008, http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/Presseinfo-BMJ-
Wechse-Kodex-Kommission_en.pdf. 
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recommendations.171  A legislative proposal introduced by the Ministry of 
Justice in March 2005 changed this state of ambivalence.172 According to 
the new provisions, which came into force on 1 January 2006, companies 
are obliged to disclose detailed management earnings.173 This constituted a 
dramatic change to the prior regime under sec. 285 No. 9 
Handelsgesetzbuch. Yet, the real degree to which the new legislation 
departs from the old state of the law can only be discerned when 
appreciated against the background of the political and regulatory climate 
that prevailed before and after the introduction of the new law. For this, 
we must again look to the proliferation of corporate governance codes 
generally and to the German example as a telling illustration: What 
became strikingly clear was that the introduction of self-introductory 
instruments in the area of company law did and continues to constitute a 
challenge to traditional understandings of legislative authority among 
German scholars. While there seems to be a wide-ranging consensus on 
the need to improve investor confidence, at the centre of which we find 
calls for greater corporate transparency, better accountability and a more 
effective corporate governance, much of which is endorsed in the 
recommendations and suggestions of the German Corporate Governance 
Code, the concerns about its still not fully resolved constitutional status on 
the one hand and questions of voluntary compliance on the other continue 
to be problematic. The story of the Corporate Earnings Disclosure Law of 
2005 is a most telling illustration of this ambiguity. To cite again the 
                                                 
171  Last amended version (14 June 2007), http://www.corporate-governance-
code.de/eng/download/E_Kodex_2007_markiert.pdf. But see the Press Release of the 
Commission of 18 April 2008, stating that level of compliance has been increasingly 
steadily: http://www.corporate-governance-
code.de/eng/download/080418_Pressemitteilung_2008_en.pdf (last visited 5 June 2008)  
172 Federal Minister of Justice, Brigitte Zypries, justified the regulatory advance with the 
failure of companies to voluntarily disclose their management earnings. See ‘Corporate 
Governance: Zypries fordert gläserne Vorstandsgehälter’, Manager-Magazin 14 May 
2005, http://www.manager-
magazin.de/unternehmen/vorstandsgehaelter/0,2828,299768,00.html (last visited 
5 June 2008)  
173  See Gesetz über die Offenlegung der Vorstandsvergütungen [Law Concerning the 
Disclosure of Management Earnings] of 3 August 2005, published in 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [Federal Gazette] 2005, Vol. I, p. 2267, available at: 
http://www.publicgovernance.de/pdf/vorstog_aug_05.pdf (last visited 5 June 2008) 
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Justice Minister in her speech of November 2004 relating to the draft 
legislation: “The Principle of societal self-regulation lies at the roots of the 
success of corporate governance. Rightfully this principle has received 
international support and many followers.”174 She went on to highlight the 
reasons why her government should at this time not pursue the adoption of 
a public act instead of continuing to find further voluntary support for the 
Corporate Governance Code’s recommendation to disclose individual 
earnings, declaring that she thinks that “also in this area  norms included 
in the Code are better than rigid statutory laws. Because especially in this 
sensible field voluntary changes of heart and self-regulation are more 
advantageous than state coercion. That is why we prefer – against many 
other voices – the economy’s self-regulation through a flexible 
recommendation of the Code. From our point of view, therefore there is no 
need to pass a statutory law regulating the disclosure of corporate 
earnings.”175 
 
The mood, however, changed within a matter of months. In fact, already in 
summer 2004, the Minister had underscored her commitment to industry 
self-regulation, emphasizing simultaneously, however, that she would 
pursue a legislative solution by mid-2005, if industry bosses proved 
resilient towards the Code’s recommendations.176  Much of this drive for 
                                                 
174  “Das Prinzip der gesellschaftlichen Selbstregulierung begründet den Erfolg von 
Corporate Governance. Dieses Prinzip hat zu Recht auch international Anerkennung 
erhalten und zahlreiche Anhänger gefunden.” [My translation from the German, PZ] 
175  See id., supra. “Allerdings halte ich auch in diesem Bereich Regelungen im Rahmen 
des Kodex für besser als rigide gesetzliche Vorschriften. Denn gerade auch auf diesem 
sensiblen Feld sind freiwilliges Umdenken und Selbstregulierung vorteilhafter als 
staatlicher Zwang. Daher bevorzuge ich - trotz vieler anderer Stimmen - weiterhin die 
Selbstregulierung der Wirtschaft über eine flexible Kodexvorgabe. Es besteht deshalb aus 
meiner Sicht kein Anlass, die Offenlegungspflicht bereits jetzt nach so kurzer Zeit 
gesetzlich zu normieren.” [My translation from the German, PZ]. 
176  Politik erhöht Druck auf Unternehmen zur Offenlegung der 
Manager-Bezüge, NETZEITUNG.DE, 2 August 2004, available at: 
http://www.netzeitung.de/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/298430.html (last visited 
5 June 2008); see also Wendelin Wiedeking (CEO, Porsche), “Wie man das Thema 
auch wendet, es kommt immer Unsinn heraus”[Regardless from which perspective you 
look at the issue, it always turns out to be nonsense, our translation], in: FRANKFURTER 
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, No. 64, 17 March 2005. 
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this change of mind, however, turned out to come from a place where only 
few would have expected it. None other than the chairman of the first 
Corporate Governance Commission of 2001, which had prepared not only 
the most comprehensive task list for the company law legislator in the 
post-War era, but also had called in its final report for the installation of a 
second commission mandated to draft the Corporate Governance Code177, 
Professor Theodor Baums, had become the leading voice for a statutory 
regulation of corporate earnings disclosure. In many weeks of lobbying in 
early 2005, Professor Baums scathed German industry leaders to comply 
with the recommendations of the Code to disclose their earnings in an 
individualized form: “Concerning an obligation to disclose corporate 
earnings, the Code postulates this already today. Unfortunately, however, 
there is a consensus among approximately two-thirds of all DAX 
corporations  not to follow these recommendations of the Code. In our 
view, this constitutes a veritable abuse of that instrument. And it is for this 
reason that the Federal Justice Minister is rightfully threatening with a 
statutory obligation. The EU Commission holds a similar view.”178 
 
 
2. THE HYBRIDIZATION OF LAW MAKING: THE RETURN OF THE STATE? 
 
Read this in light of the euphoric declarations regarding the value of a 
newly discovered ability of the German economy to modernize itself 
through the means of self-regulation179, and the fragility of the 
                                                 
177  T. Baums, 'Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a Law 
Making Process of a very new nature', (2001) 2 German Law Journal at: 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=43 
178  Andreas Nölting, Von gierigen Vorständen und albernen Vergleichen (Interview with 
Theodor Baums), MANAGER MAGAZIN, 26 April 2004, available at: http://www.manager-
magazin.de/unternehmen/vorstandsgehaelter/0,2828,305446-3,00.html (last visited 5 June 
2008). See id., “Was die Offenlegungspflicht angeht, so besteht sie nach dem Kodex 
schon heute. Es gibt aber leider eine Übereinstimmung von etwa zwei Drittel der Dax-
Unternehmen darüber, dass man sich an diese Empfehlungen des Corporate-
Governance-Kodex nicht hält. Das ist meines Erachtens ein klarer Missbrauch dieses 
Instruments. Und das bedeutet, dass die Bundesjustizministerin Recht hat mit ihrer 
Drohung, dass wir eine gesetzliche Vorgabe haben müssen. Die EU-Kommission sieht 
das ähnlich.” [My translation, PZ] 
179  See, supra, III B 2 
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embeddedness of corporate and industry self-regulation is in the larger 
regulatory culture. To speak, like Professor Baums did in the cited 
interview, of an ‘abuse’ of the Code by companies mutually agreeing not 
to provide an individualized disclosure of their management compensation 
schemes, surely turns the idea of self-regulation on its head. This is even 
more remarkable as Professor Baums himself highlighted the innovative 
and reform potential of self-regulation, which he studied with his 
commission between 2000 and 2001, before submitting his final report to 
the German government in July 2001.180 Likewise, the Justice Minister 
highlighted the success of corporate self-regulation through Corporate 
Governance Codes, referring specifically to the recently revised Corporate 
Governance Principles drafted by the OECD.181  
 
The regulatory origin and scope of the recent German legislation is of 
particular interest in that it underlines the above-suggested hybridisation of 
the norms governing this field. While the Ministry makes it very clear that 
it deems earnings disclosure of management to be of vital importance for 
rebuilding and strengthening international investor confidence in German 
firms, the draft foresees the possibility for the shareholder assembly to 
vote against disclosure with a ¾ majority.182 Certainly, while this has met 
with criticism, this option powerfully underscores the political dilemma 
the legislator is facing in this area. Given the stern and outspoken 
resistance of influential industry leaders in the past months against an 
obligation to disclose management earnings, the option clause seems a 
well-reasoned compromise. But, with regard to the perspective taken here 
on the changing shape of reforming a fast evolving and highly sensitive 
area such as company law, the larger questions lie elsewhere. The 
remuneration dispute is but the tip of the iceberg of the longstanding 
                                                 
180  T. Baums, 'Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a Law 
Making Process of a very new nature', (2001) 2 German Law Journal at: 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=43 
181  Federal Minister of Justice, Brigitte Zypries, Speech before the Annual Handelsblatt 
Conference, 18 November 2004 
182  See GESETZ ÜBER DIE OFFENLEGUNG DER VORSTANDSVERGÜTUNGEN [VorstOG] 
(Federal CEO Earnings Disclosure Act) of August 3, 2005, published in: 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBl] (Federal Gazette) 2005 Vol. I, p. 2267 (available at: 
http://www.publicgovernance.de/pdf/vorstog_aug_05.pdf, Art. 1 (2), inserting a new 
para. 5 to s. 286 Aktiengesetz [Stock Corporation Law] 
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struggle over adequate ways of valuating the firm and, with it, a richer 
assessment of what is at stake in the current shareholder value debate. 
Clearly, Ferrarini, Moloney and Vespro are right in their assertion that “It 
is easier to find problems than solutions in this field.”183 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
A very important element in the making of border-crossing corporate 
governance regimes is their specific emergence through soft-law, often 
issued and disseminated by non-state actors such as international 
organizations, associations or private corporations. While this paper 
highlighted the particular dynamics through which the ‘juridical 
touchdown’ will sometimes occur with domestic governments initiating 
legislative projects to enhance, further ground or to enforce the soft norms 
of corporate self-regulation, the lesson to be learned consists in 
sensibilising us to the intricate interwoven character of private and public 
regulation in this context. One the one hand, much of the law making 
developments in this area could not be imagined without the push coming 
from non-state actors, issuing and disseminating codes of conduct, 
recommendations and norms for the global market place. On the other 
hand, however, the German case study illustrated the particular, deeply 
embedded regulatory dynamics of norm-creation in a much contested area. 
As corporate governance scholarship continues to sharpen its lens for 
deeper structures of formal/informal norm-creation and the particular 
socio-economic cultures184 in which different hybrid regulatory 
approaches emerge, it becomes evident to which degree ‘comparative 
corporate governance’185 is being transformed in a multi-disciplinary area 
of regulatory analysis. Our focus on the way in which corporate 
                                                 
183  G. Ferrarini/N. Moloney/C. Vespro, 'Executive Compensation in the EU: 
Comparative Law and Practice', (2003) ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, WP No. 
09/2003 , at 66. 
184 See only A. N. Licht, 'The Mother of all Path-Dependencies: Towards a Cross-
Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems', (2001) 26 Delaware Journal of 
Corporate Law 147-205. 
185 M. J. Roe, 'Comparative corporate governance', in P. Newman (eds.), The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (Palgrave Macmillan, 1998) 
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governance principles are received by and simultaneously are shaping 
different national political economies sharpens our perceptions for the 
existing differences in countries’ corporate laws, but even more so for the 
specific ways in which soft law becomes intertwined, changed, adapted 
and interwoven within a regulatory environment which itself is no longer 
stable. To cite, once again, the German example: the major corporate 
reform of 1998, the so-called Transparency and Control Legislation186, did 
begin a lengthy process of national soul-searching into the governing 
principles of a set of company law rules, the scope and content of which 
had for some time already ceased to be a merely domestic concern, but 
had instead become part of a transnational debate over ‘good corporate 
governance’. While domestic politicians, scholars and lobbyists would 
engage in deliberating over every detail of German corporate 
governance187, the issues being discussed, the proposals on the table and 
the problem awareness among the law reformers were of veritable 
transnational nature, emerging from parallel reform efforts in other 
countries, among private and non-state actors around the world and the 
public at large. In that sense188, domestic company law reform can clearly 
be seen as part of an emerging transnational legal pluralism. Its defining 
feature is the continuing contestation of the very distinction on which legal 
pluralism would be conceived to rest upon to begin with: the distinction 
between law and non-law. 
 
As has become clear, corporate governance norms offer themselves as a 
telling example of the transformation of traditional state-originating, 
official norm-setting in favour of increasingly de-centralized, multi-level 
processes of norm production. At the same time, not only are norms 
produced on more levels; the nature of these norms themselves changes 
                                                 
186  Hereto, see, e.g., J. W. Cioffi, 'Restructuring "Germany Inc.": The Politics of 
Corporate Governance Reform in Germany and the European Union', (2002) 24 Law & 
Policy 355-402. 
187  See the brilliant illustration provided by M. Höpner, 'European Corporate 
Governance Reform and the German Party Paradox', in: Max-Planck-Institut für 
Gesellschaftsforschung, available at: http://www.mpi-fg-
koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp03-4.pdf 
188  Referring to examples of transnational human rights litigation, see hereto R. Wai, 
'Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in Contested Global Society', (2005) 46 
Harv. Int'l L.J. 471-486, 475-476. 
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dramatically. What our assessment of the present trajectories of ECGR and 
the case study of Germany so far have illuminated is the changing nature 
of regulating business in globally interdependent markets, suggesting 
nothing less than a far-reaching erosion of boundaries between state and 
non-state actors, official and unofficial law, public and private ordering.189 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
189  See e.g. V. Gessner/R. P. Appelbaum/W. F. Felstiner, 'Introduction: The Legal 
Culture of Global Business Transactions', in V. Gessner,R. P. Appelbaum and W. F. 
Felstiner (eds.), Rules and Networks: The Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions 
(Hart Publishing, 2001); Francis Snyder, Economic Globalisation and the Law in the 21st 
Century, in: The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society (2003); K. Pistor, 'Of Legal 
Transplants, Legal Irritants, and Economic Development', in P. Cornelius and B. Kogut 
(eds.), Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy (Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
